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UNEQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW: WHY FDA
SHOULD USE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING TO REFORM
THE REGULATION OF GENERIC DRUGS
Marie Boydt
The duty to ensure the safety of drug products, through adequate
warnings or other means, should ultimately rest with the drug's
manufacturer regardless of whether the drug is a generic drug or a brand-
name drug. Recent U.S. Supreme Court holdings, however, suggest that
while the manufacturer of a brand-name drug is always responsible for its
label's content, this is not the case for generic drugs. In addition, by holding
that failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers based on
state law are preempted, the Court has removed the protections and
compensation that state tort law can provide consumers of generic drugs
and exposed a gap in the regulation of generic drugs in which no
manufacturer is responsible for updating the labeling.
This Article argues that to remedy these issues, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) should use negotiated rulemaking to work with drug
manufacturers, consumer representatives, healthcare providers, and other
interests to create new drug regulations. Although FDA has not used the
negotiated rulemaking process set forth by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 1990 to date, the current regulatory environment has several features
that suggest it may be well-suited for negotiated rulemaking. In addition,
employing negotiated rulemaking to create new drug regulations may yield
benefits over conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking and may
ultimately produce a more effective and legitimate rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that two patients each go to a doctor and receive a
prescription for the same brand-name drug. Each patient then takes her
prescription to a pharmacist to be filled. One patient receives the brand-
name drug. The other-consistent with a state law permitting or
requiring that the pharmacist substitute a therapeutically equivalent
generic drug for the brand-name drug-receives a generic drug.1 Each
patient suffers a similar drug-caused injury, files a lawsuit against the
manufacturer of the drug that she took, and alleges that under state law
the manufacturer failed to adequately warn of the risk of the injury she
suffered. The patient who took the brand-name drug may recover
monetarily from the drug's manufacturer for her injuries, but the
patient who took the generic drug cannot. 2 The result for the patient
who took the generic drug would not change even if the brand-name
drug was no longer on the market.
The duty to ensure the safety of a drug product, through adequate
warnings or other means, should ultimately rest with the drug's
manufacturer regardless of whether the drug is a generic or brand-name
product.3 Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest that
while the manufacturer of a brand-name drug "bears responsibility for
the content of its label at all times,"4 this is not the case for generic drug
manufacturers.5 In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court held that the plaintiffs
state failure-to-warn claims against the brand-name manufacturer were
not preempted because it was possible for the manufacturer to comply
1 See NAT'L ASS'N OF BDS. OF PHARMACY, SURVEY OF PHARMACY LAW 67-70 (2013)
(identifying thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia that permit a pharmacist to
substitute a generic drug, and thirteen states that require generic substitution if certain
requirements are met).
2 This may be the reality confronting patients who allege that they were injured by generic
drugs because the drugs' manufacturers failed to adequately warn of the risks. Compare Schork
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 4:10-cv-00005-RLY-WGH, 2011 WL 4402602 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
22, 2011) (granting summary judgment pursuant to PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011), against a plaintiff who required an amputation after receiving a generic version of the
drug Phenergan), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (holding that the state failure-to-
warn claims of a plaintiff who required an amputation after receiving Phenergan were not
preempted).
3 See infra Part I.C.2.
4 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570-71.
5 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555); see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2479
(2013).
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with both state and federal law.6 In contrast, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
the Court held that the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims against the
generic drug manufacturers based on state law were preempted because
it was impossible for those manufacturers, who cannot independently
change their drugs' labels under the current federal law, "to comply with
both their state-law duty to change the label and their federal law duty
to keep the label the same."7 Both the majority and the dissent in
Mensing recognized that, from the perspective of the plaintiffs, finding
preemption in Mensing but not in Wyeth "makes little sense."8 This
seemingly inconsistent result is due to differences in how brand-name
and generic drugs are regulated under federal law.
The preemption of state failure-to-warn claims against generic
drug manufacturers-and the Supreme Court's subsequent extension of
this holding to at least some design-defect claims9-could potentially
have a widespread effect due to the scope of the generic drug market
and the incidence of adverse drug effects. Generic drugs account for
approximately eighty percent of the prescriptions dispensed in the
United States, 10 and approximately twenty-three to thirty-two percent of
drugs are available solely as generics." In addition, in the United States
there are approximately 106,000 deaths per year from "nonerror,
adverse effects of medications," and the actual magnitude of adverse
drug effects is likely greater because that estimate does "not include
adverse effects that are associated with disability or discomfort."2 By
holding that state failure-to-warn claims against generic drug
manufacturers are preempted, the Supreme Court eliminated the
protections that state tort law can provide to consumers of generic drugs
through the law's compensation and information disclosure functions.
The Court's opinion also exposed a gap in the federal regulation of
6 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581.
7 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578; see also id. at 2581. The Supreme Court later relied on this
holding to conclude that "state-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug's
warnings are pre-empted by federal law. . .. " Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
8 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581; id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
9 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
10 Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir. of Health Care, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (GAO),
to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 2, 9 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
590/588064.pdf, IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE
UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF 2011, at 26 (Apr. 2012), http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/
Content/Insights/IMS%2OInstitute%20for%20Healthcare%201nformatics/IHII Medicinesin_
U.S-Report_201 1.pdf. The portion of drugs dispensed as generics is even higher (about ninety-
three percent) when only drugs for which a generic is available are considered. Letter from John
E. Dicken to Orrin G. Hatch, supra, at 9; see also IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS,
supra (ninety-four percent).
11 Brief for Marc T. Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501).
12 Barbara Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483, 484 (2000).
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generic drug labeling in which no manufacturer is responsible for
updating the labeling. 13
In apparent recognition of the gravity of these issues, the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) is "considering a regulatory change
that would allow generic manufacturers, like brand-name
manufacturers, to change their labeling in appropriate circumstances."14
FDA has published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing
to amend its regulations for both brand-name and generic drugs "to
revise and clarify procedures for application holders of an approved
drug ... to change the product labeling to reflect certain types of newly
acquired information in advance of FDA's review of the change" using a
modified "changes-being-effected" (CBE) process (FDA's proposed
rule).15 The publication of an NPRM is the first step in notice-and-
comment or informal rulemaking set forth by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).16
This Article argues that, rather than proceed with the conventional
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, FDA should instead use
negotiated rulemaking to work with drug manufacturers, healthcare
providers, consumers, and other stakeholders to address the issues
raised and exposed by Mensing and build consensus. Employing
negotiated rulemaking to amend FDA's regulations may offer benefits
over notice-and-comment rulemaking by fostering the development of a
more effective and enforceable rule and increasing the legitimacy of the
final rule.
This Article proceeds in several parts: Part I provides an overview
of the relevant drug labeling law and the implications of Mensing. Part II
describes and analyzes several proposals to address these issues and
highlights additional issues that should be considered in formulating
and evaluating any proposed remedy. Part III provides a discussion of
the negotiated rulemaking literature and an overview of the framework
for negotiated rulemaking provided by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 1990 (NRA). It also discusses FDA's lack of experience with this
process. Part IV argues that FDA should use negotiated rulemaking to
13 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Stacey B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing:
Generic Consumers' Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 209, 239-40
(2012). For both brand-name and generic drugs, a "label" is the "display of written, printed, or
graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article," and "labeling" is "all labels and
other written, printed, or graphic matter ... upon any article or any of its containers or
wrappers, or ... accompanying such article." 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m) (2012).
14 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15 n.2, Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142); Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988-89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314,610).
15 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,985.
16 See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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address the issues highlighted in this Article. It also responds to
potential critiques of this proposal.
I. PREEMPTION AND THE REGULATION OF DRUGS
A. Federal Preemption and State Failure-to-Warn and Design-Defect
Claims
As a result of Wyeth and Mensing, state failure-to-warn claims may
be available to a patient injured by the brand-name version of a drug,
but not to a patient injured by a generic version of the drug.'7 Both cases
involved patient injuries following the administration of a prescription
drug and allegations that the manufacturers of the drug failed to warn
the patient plaintiff of the risk of the injuries suffered. In one case,
however, a brand-name drug was administered; whereas in the other a
generic drug was administered, and the preemption results were
different. This Section provides a brief overview of both cases as well as
the Supreme Court's decision in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett, 18which applied Mensing in the context of a state design-defect
claim.
1. Brand-Name Drugs: Wyeth v. Levine
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court examined whether federal law
preempted a plaintiffs state-law claim that brand-name drug labeling
did not contain an adequate warning; the Court ultimately held that it
did not.19 The plaintiff received Wyeth's brand-name anti-nausea drug,
Phenergan, when she sought treatment for a migraine headache and
accompanying nausea. As a result of the injection of Phenergan, which
"causes irreversible gangrene if it enters a patient's artery," the plaintiff
developed gangrene and doctors amputated her hand and forearm.20
The plaintiff alleged that the Phenergan "labeling was defective because
it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method of intravenous
administration instead of the higher risk IV-push method" that the
plaintiff received.21 Wyeth argued that the plaintiffs claims were
preempted because it could not comply with both its federal and state
labeling duties; it argued that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
17 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2567.
18 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
19 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 564-65, 581.
20 Id. at 559.
21 Id. at 560.
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(FDCA) and FDA's regulations required it to keep the drug labeling the
same as that in its approved New Drug Application (NDA) and that
state law required it to change the drug's labeling.22 Wyeth also argued
that enforcing the state-law duty and holding it liable for not removing
IV-push injection from the approved methods of administering the
drug would obstruct the "purposes and objectives" of the federal
regulatory scheme.23
The Court rejected both arguments and held that the plaintiffs
claims were not preempted on either ground.24 According to the Court,
Wyeth could have unilaterally strengthened its warning under FDA's
CBE regulation; thus, it was not impossible for it to comply with both
the federal and state requirements.25 The Court stated that "it has
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all
times."26 Although Wyeth dealt with a brand-name drug, some courts-
including the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals27-extended its
principles to generic drugs.28
2. Generic Drugs: PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
Approximately two years after the Supreme Court held in Wyeth
that the plaintiffs state failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturer
of a brand-name drug were not preempted by federal law, the Court
considered whether similar claims against the manufacturers of generic
drugs were preempted in Mensing, which consolidated cases from the
Fifth and Eight Circuits.29 In each case, the plaintiff was prescribed
22 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1-4, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249); Brief for Petitioner
at 33-34, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249).
23 Brief for Petitioner at 27, 40-41, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)).
24 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581.
25 Id. at 571, 573. The Court acknowledged that FDA could have rejected the
manufacturer's labeling changes, but concluded that, "absent clear evidence that the FDA
would not have approved a change to Phenergan's label," it was not impossible for Wyeth to
comply with both the federal and state requirements. Id. at 571.
26 Id. at 570-71. The Court also concluded that Levine's tort suit did not obstruct
Congress's purpose in enacting the regulatory scheme. Id. at 581.
27 Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010), rev'd, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131
S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009), rev'd, Mensing, 131 S.
Ct. 2567.
28 See, e.g., Weilbrenner v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337-38 (M.D.
Ga. 2010) (collecting cases that rejected generic drug manufacturers' preemption defense). But
see Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 677, 680, 689 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (denying motion to
reconsider dismissal of plaintiffs failure-to-warn claims against generic drug manufacturers
based on federal preemption), adhered to by No. 1:07-CV-176-R, 2009 WL 736200 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 4, 2009).
29 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572-73.
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Reglan-the brand-name version of the drug metoclopramide-which
is used to treat digestive tract problems.30 Consistent with state law, each
plaintiff received a generic version of metoclopramide from her
pharmacist and, after taking the drug for several years, developed a
severe neurological disorder-tardive dyskinesia.31 Each plaintiff sued
the manufacturer of the generic metoclopramide that she had taken,
alleging that the manufacturer was liable under state law for failing to
provide adequate warnings in light of "mounting evidence that long
term metoclopramide use carries a risk of tardive dyskinesia far greater
than that indicated on the label."32 The plaintiffs argued that the generic
manufacturers could have complied with their state-law duties to
adequately warn of the drugs' risks by changing the labeling of their
products.
In Mensing, the Supreme Court held that state failure-to-warn
claims against generic drug manufacturers were preempted because it
was "impossible" for the manufacturers to comply with both state and
federal law.33 The generic manufacturers could not independently
comply with (1) their federal duty that the labeling of their generic drug
products be the same as the corresponding brand-name drug labeling,
and (2) their state-law duty to change the labeling to strengthen their
warnings.34 The fact that the manufacturers may have been able to
propose changes to FDA, which may have eventually led to revised
labeling, was not sufficient to prevent preemption because the Court
framed the preemption question as whether a party can, under federal
law, independently do what is required under state law. 3
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2572-73.
32 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). One plaintiff sued two generic manufacturers.
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057-58 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 588 F.3d 603
(8th Cir. 2009), rev'd, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
33 Mensing, 131 S. Ct at-2578.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2578-79. The Court did not decide whether FDA's regulations require generic drug
manufacturers to propose a label change to the agency. Id. at 2577; see also id. at 2586. The
Court referred exclusively to the statutes and regulations predating the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA). Id. at 2574 n.i. Although FDAAA
increased FDA's safety labeling authority, it does not appear to have changed the preemption
analysis for generics. See FDAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, tit. IX, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); FDA,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, SAFETY LABELING CHANGES-IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION
505(o)(4) OF THE FD&C ACT 5-6 (July 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/-Guidances/UCM250783.pdf see also
Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 10-1552, 2011 WL 6056546, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2011); In re
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), MDL No. 2243, Civ. No. 08-008
(GEB-LHG), 2011 WL 5903623, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011).
Several courts have read Mensing as not preempting state failure-to-warn claims against
generic manufacturers when it is alleged that the generic labeling differed from that of the
brand-name drug. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150, 158-59
(Ct. App. 2013) (collecting cases). But see Huck v. Trimark Physicians Grp., No. 12-0596, 2013
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FDA's interpretation of its regulations was set forth in the United
States' amicus briefs.36 The Court deferred to FDA's interpretation of its
regulations as requiring that the generic manufacturer's labeling "always
be the same" as that of the brand-name drug and precluding a generic
manufacturer from unilaterally strengthening its drug's warnings using
the CBE process.37 FDA interpreted its regulations as permitting a
generic manufacturer to use the CBE process to change the labeling of a
generic drug only when the change was to match the labeling of the
corresponding brand-name drug or to follow FDA's instructions.38 The
Court also deferred to FDA's interpretation that its regulations prevent
a generic drug company from sending a "Dear Doctor letter that
contain [s] substantial new warning information."9 The Court
distinguished Wyeth on the basis that the regulations for generic drugs
are "meaningfully different" from the regulations for brand-name
drugs.40
3. Generic Drugs: Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
More recently, in Bartlett, the Supreme Court held that "state-law
design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug's warnings are
WL 1749774, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding plaintiffs argument that the generic
drug manufacturer was liable "because it failed to update its label to conform with" that of the
brand-name drug was "without merit" as a private attempt to enforce the FDCA).
36 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14-19,
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) [hereinafter U.S. Brief Supporting
Respondents]; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-18, 22 n.10, Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) [hereinafter U.S. Brief]; Abbreviated New Drug
Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992) (rejecting comments that
stated that FDA's "labeling provisions should be revised to permit ANDA applicants to deviate
from the labeling for the reference listed drug to add contraindications, warnings, precautions,
adverse reactions, and other safety-related information"); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
CHANGES TO AN APPROVED NDA OR ANDA 24 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter FDA CHANGES
GUIDANCE] ("All labeling changes for ANDA drug products must be consistent with section
5050) of the Act [(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j))].").
37 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575; see also Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 16.
38 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575; U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 14-17
& 16 nn.7-8.
39 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576; U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 18-19.
40 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582. The manufacturers did not argue "purposes-and-objectives"
preemption before the Court. Id. at 2581 n.8, 2587. A plurality of the Court read the clause "any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding" as "plainly
contemplat[ing] conflict pre-emption by describing federal law as effectively repealing contrary
state law." Id. at 2579 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Kennedy, however, did not
join that portion of the opinion. See id. at 2572.
Four Justices dissented in Mensing, arguing that the state failure-to-warn claims were not
preempted because the generic drug manufacturers could have proposed a labeling change to
the FDA, and if the FDA agreed with the proposed change, it could "initiate a change to the
brand-name label, triggering a corresponding change to the generic labels." Id. at 2582
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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pre-empted by federal law under [Mensing]."41 The Court stated that the
state design-defect law "imposes a duty on manufacturers to ensure that
the drugs they market are not unreasonably unsafe," which "is evaluated
by reference to both [a drug's] chemical properties and the adequacy of
its warnings."42 The Court found that, since the generic manufacturer
could not change the drug's design, the state law "ultimately required it
to change [the drug's] labeling"43-a course of action that had been
foreclosed under the Court's decision in Mensing. The Court's finding of
preemption in Bartlett relied heavily on Mensing and the regulatory
scheme for drug labeling updates,44 Which are the focus of the remainder
of this Article.
B. The Regulatory Framework for Drugs
The different results in Wyeth and Mensing-that failure-to-warn
claims are not preempted for brand-name drugs, but are for generic
drugs-stem from differences in the federal regulation of brand-name
and generic drugs.45 This Article now turns to those differences.
1. Brand-Name Drugs
FDA must approve a drug before it can be marketed in the United
States.46 The drug development and approval process for new chemical
41 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013). The plaintiff was prescribed the
brand-name non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID) Clinoril for shoulder pain, but
instead received a generic form of the drug from her pharmacist. Id. at 2472. After the plaintiff
took the drug, "[slixty to sixty-five percent of the surface of [her] body deteriorated, was
burned off, or turned into an open wound," leaving her "severely disfigured," physically
disabled, and "nearly blind." Id. She sued the generic drug manufacturer, asserting a design-
defect claim under state law. The plaintiff also asserted a failure-to-warn claim, which was
dismissed by the district court. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220, 228-29
(D.N.H. 2011).
42 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
43 Id. at 2474. The Court rejected the First Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning that the
generic manufacturer could simply stop selling the drug to comply with both state and federal
law. Id. at 2477.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented; Justice Breyer argued that it was not
impossible for the generic manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law, as the
manufacturer could comply by not doing business in the state or paying damages. Id. at 2480-
82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, also dissented; Justice
Sotomayor argued that Bartlett extended Mensing "to pre-empt New Hampshire's law
governing design-defects with respect to generic drugs" and, in doing so, "left a seriously
injured consumer without any remedy." Id. at 2482, 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
44 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (majority opinion).
45 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (stating that the Court "will not distort the Supremacy Clause
in order to create similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme").
46 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
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entity drugs is time intensive and costly; on average, it takes ten to
fifteen years of research and development, and costs over $2 billion
dollars.47 To get a drug approved, the manufacturer must file an NDA,
which includes "full reports of investigations which have been made to
show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use."48 FDA then evaluates the safety and effectiveness of the
drug.49 FDA must deny the application if it finds that there is not
"substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in its proposed labeling."5o FDA also
evaluates and approves the drug's labeling, which must include
warnings that "describe serious adverse reactions and potential safety
hazards, limitations in use imposed by them, and steps that should be
taken if they occur."5'
Consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Wyeth "that the
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all
times,"52 FDA's regulations provide that a manufacturer must revise the
labeling "to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as
soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a
drug."53 Failure to do so may render the drug misbranded in violation of
the FDCA.54 This responsibility is important because the risks of a drug
may not emerge until after the drug is approved. 55
FDA's regulations provide several processes by which a
manufacturer can change approved drug labeling. Which processes are
available to the manufacturer depends on the change and whether it is
minor, moderate, or major under FDA's regulations and guidance.56 Of
47 See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW 643 (4th ed. 2014).
48 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); see also id. 5 355(d).
49 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (listing required contents of a new drug application); id. § 355(d)
(setting forth grounds for refusing an application); see also id. § 321(p) (defining the term "new
drug"); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 784 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
50 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Substantial evidence includes clinical trials. Id.
51 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2013); see also id. § 201.57(c)(6).
52 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 570-71 (2009).
53 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i); see also id. § 201.80(e). Manufacturers are also subject to
post-approval reporting requirements; these requirements include the submission of adverse
event reports to FDA. Id. §§ 314.80, 314.81.
54 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 352.
55 See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 472, 477 (2008).
56 21 C.F.R. § 314.70; FDA CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note 36, at 24-26. Minor changes-
e.g., an editorial labeling change such as adding a distributor's name-may be described by the
manufacturer in an annual report. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(d); FDA CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note
36, at 26. Major changes-e.g., labeling changes associated with new indications and usage-
must be submitted to FDA in a supplement and receive FDA approval before use. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(b); FDA CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note 36, at 24.
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particular relevance to the current discussion are the processes for
moderate changes, which were central to both Wyeth and Mensing.57
For moderate changes, the manufacturer must submit a CBE
supplement to FDA that explains the basis for the change.58 For certain
labeling changes-e.g., "[c]hanges in the labeling to reflect newly
acquired information ... [t]o add or strengthen a contraindication,
warning, precaution, or adverse reaction for which the evidence of a
causal association satisfies the standard for inclusion in the labeling
under" the agency's prescription drug labeling regulations59-FDA
permits the manufacturer to make the change when the CBE
supplement is received by FDA.60
A manufacturer can also use "Dear Health Care Provider Letters"
or "Dear Doctor Letters"-letters mailed to physicians and other
healthcare providers-to describe updated warnings.61 FDA considers
such letters labeling; therefore, such letters must be consistent with the
drug's approved labeling.62 Thus, the relevant regulations for brand-
name drugs provide processes by which a manufacturer can update a
drug's labeling.
2. Generic Drugs
The approval process for generic drugs differs from that for brand-
name drugs. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act) created an abbreviated pathway
to market for generic drugs-the Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) process. 63
There is little legislative history for the Hatch-Waxman Act;64
however, it is often viewed as reflecting a compromise between generic
57 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568-73; PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2575-76 (2011).
58 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c); FDA CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note 36, at 25-26.
59 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see also id. § 201.57; Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 569 ("'[N]ewly
acquired information' is not limited to new data, but also encompasses 'new analyses of
previously submitted data."') (internal quotation marks omitted); Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg.
49,603, 49,604, 49,609 (Aug. 22, 2008).
60 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6); FDA CHANGES GUIDANCE, supra note 36, at 25-26. FDA
considers the "[a]ddition of an adverse event due to information reported to the applicant or
Agency" to fall within this category of moderate changes. Id. at 26.
61 See 21 C.F.R. § 200.5; FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: DEAR HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER LETTERS: IMPROVING COMMUNICATION OF IMPORTANT SAFETY INFORMATION
(Jan. 2014), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf.
62 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011).
63 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
64 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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drug manufacturers who were granted an abbreviated approval pathway
and brand-name drug manufacturers who gained additional patent
protections. 65 A generic drug is approved on the basis of information
showing that it is bioequivalent to a reference listed drug (RLD), which
is generally a brand-name drug.66 The manufacturer of a generic drug
must also show, among other things, that the proposed labeling for the
generic drug "is the same as" the RLD's approved labeling.67
FDA's regulations, like the statute, provide that an ANDA must
include a statement that the proposed labeling "is the same as" the
RLD's labeling.68 The regulations also add that one of the grounds for
withdrawal of an approved ANDA is if the product's labeling "is no
longer consistent with that" of the RLD.69 The United States' briefs in
Mensing set forth FDA's interpretation that these regulations create a
continuing requirement of sameness and prevent generic manufacturers
65 See, e.g., Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or
Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 250 (2002); Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser &
Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
585, 590 (2003); see also Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
66 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), (j)(4)(F), (j)(7) (2012); FDA, Orange Book: Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder
ob/docs/queryai.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). An RLD is "the listed drug identified by FDA
as the drug product upon which an applicant relies in seeking approval of its abbreviated
application." 21 C.F.R. § 314.3; see also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57
Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,958 (Apr. 28, 1992) (noting, in the preamble to FDA's ANDA Regulations,
that, "{g]enerally, the [RLD] will be the NDA drug product for a single source drug product").
67 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A), (j)(4) (emphasis added). The FDCA permits some differences
between the labeling of the RLD and generic drugs, namely "changes required because of
differences approved under" a prior approval petition or because the drugs "are produced or
distributed by different manufacturers." 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G); see also Mensing,
131 S. Ct. at 2574; Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 17,950,
17,953, 17960-61, 17,984-87 (preamble and final regulations); Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. at 1586 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355). FDA's regulations provide a nonexclusive list of permissible
differences, which "may include differences in expiration date, formulation, bioavailability, or
pharmacokinetics, labeling revisions made to comply with current FDA labeling guidelines or
other guidance, or omission of an indication or other aspect of labeling protected by patent or
accorded exclusivity under section 505(j)(5)(F) of the [FDCA]." 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv).
There was little discussion of the term "the same as" in the legislative history of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, but the history that exists suggests that the term was intended to permit at
least some differences between a generic drug and the corresponding RLD. A 1984 House
Report adopts FDA's policy-set forth in the agency's regulations regarding ANDAs for pre-
1962 pioneer drugs-of making no distinction between the terms "identical" and "same," but
with respect to the requirement that an ANDA "show that the proposed labeling for the generic
drug is the same as that of the listed drug," the Report "recognizes that the proposed labeling
for the generic drug may not be exactly the same." H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 21-22
(capitalization in original removed). For example, "the name and address of the manufacturers
would vary as might the expiration dates for the two products," and if the generic drug uses a
color different than the brand-name drug, the "generic manufacturer . .. would have to specify
a different color in its label." Id. (capitalization in original removed).
68 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.127(a)(7); see also id. § 314.105(c).
69 Id. § 314.150(b)(10). There appears to be no parallel withdrawal requirement explicitly
provided in the FDCA.
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from using the CBE process or Dear Doctor Letters to make the changes
to generic drug labeling required by state law.70 The Court deferred to
this interpretation.71
C. Tort Law and the Regulation of Generic Drugs
1. The Functions of State Failure-to-Warn Claims: Compensation and
Information
Both the majority and the dissent in Mensing recognized that the
different preemption results make little sense from the perspective of the
plaintiffs, 72 who are without a remedy against generic manufacturers for
failure-to-warn claims.73 One important function of tort law is that it
provides compensation to injured persons. 74 This is not, however, the
only way in which tort law complements the regulatory system; tort law
can also bring to light and incentivize the disclosure of drug risk
information. For example, David Kessler, former FDA Commissioner,
and David Vladeck, former Director of the Federal Trade Commission's
Bureau of Consumer Protection, have argued that "FDA's ability to
assure the safety of the drugs being marketed in the United
States.. . . has long been hamstrung by resource limitations and gaps in
the agency's statutory authority," and the drug approval system is based
on "clinical testing that cannot, and is not designed to, uncover risks
that are relatively rare or have long latency periods."75 Accordingly,
70 U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 14-19; see also U.S. Brief, supra
note 36, at 12-18, 22 n.10; Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at
17,961 (preamble).
71 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
72 Id. at 2581; id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
73 See James M. Beck, Generic Drug Preemption Scorecard, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Sept.
20, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/09/generic-drug-preemption-
scorecard.html.
74 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 293, 301 (2007) (noting that "[tiort, whatever its shortcomings, does double-duty: it is an
engine of compensation as well as deterrence").
75 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 55, at 483; David C. Vladeck, GEORGETOWN L.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/vladeck-david-c.cfm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); see
also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 579 (2009) (stating that state tort suits "serve a distinct
compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward with information");
Brief for Marc T. Law et al., supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the functions of state tort law suits);
Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 1089 (2007) (examining the "preemption doctrine as it relates to the food and drug laws");
Lee, supra note 13, at 242-44 (discussing the contributions of state tort law to product safety);
Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J.
TORT L. 4 (2006) (examining the relationship between tort law and the administrative state);
Rabin, supra note 74, at 301-02 (discussing industry capture, underfunded regulators, and use
of industry data); Eric S. Almon, Comment, Preemption of State Failure-to-Warn Claims After
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litigation can serve an important role in bringing to light information
not otherwise available to the agency, 76 and providing "incentives for
drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly."77
By holding that state failure-to-warn claims against generic
manufacturers are preempted, the Court in Mensing removed an
"important[] layer of consumer protection that complements FDA
regulation."78 As the dissent argued, the majority's opinion "strips
generic-drug consumers of compensation when they are injured by
inadequate warnings," and "eliminates the traditional state-law
incentives for generic manufacturers to monitor and disclose safety
risks."79 As a result, the protections for consumers of generic drugs and
brand-name drugs are unequal and, as the Court remarked, the
plaintiffs were dealt an "unfortunate hand."80 Any proposal designed to
address the holding in Mensing should address this inequality and fulfill
both the compensatory and informative functions of tort law.
2. Manufacturer Responsibility for Labeling
Mensing also exposed a gap in the federal regulation of generic
drugs and their labeling. The manufacturer of a brand-name drug must
ensure that the drug's labeling is appropriately updated as long as the
drug is marketed.81 When the brand-name drug labeling is updated,
manufacturers are required to update the labeling of their
Wyeth v. Levine: The Regulatory Function of State Tort Law, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 215 (2010)
(arguing that generic manufacturers should not be immune from state tort liability for defective
labeling practices).
76 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 55, at 491-95.
77 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.
78 PLIVA v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Wyeth, 555
U.S. at 579. This holding has also been applied by the Supreme Court to foreclose at least some
design-defect claims. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
79 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592; see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling
Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988-89
(proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 610) ("The Mensing decision
alters the incentives for generic drug manufacturers to comply with current requirements to
conduct robust postmarketing surveillance, evaluation, and reporting, and to ensure that the
labeling for their drugs is accurate and up-to-date."); FDA's Response to Pub. Citizen Citizen
Petition, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0675, at 3 (Nov. 8, 2013) [hereinafter FDA Response to
Public Citizen], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-
0675-0009 ("The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Pliva v. Mensing prompted FDA to evaluate
its current regulations because this decision, as well as the recent decision in Mutual v. Bartlett,
may alter the incentives for generic drug manufacturers to comply with current statutory and
regulatory requirements to conduct robust postmarketing surveillance, evaluation, and
reporting, and to ensure that their product labeling is accurate and up to date." (footnote
omitted)).
80 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
81 See supra Part I.B.1.
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corresponding generic drugs accordingly.82 But if the brand-name drug
goes off the market, leaving only the generic versions,83 there is a gap in
the regulatory system.84 Since manufacturers cannot independently
change their generic drug labeling under the current regulatory
framework, once the brand-name drug leaves the market, there is no
manufacturer responsible for updating the warnings on the labeling in
light of newly acquired information.85 This is particularly concerning
given that serious drug risks may not be identified until after generic
market entry, and many generic drugs no longer have a marketed
corresponding brand-name drug.86 Any proposal to address the holding
in Mensing should eliminate this regulatory gap.
II. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE REGULATION OF GENERIC
DRUGS
Commentators have engaged in substantial discussion of Mensing.
This Part reviews and analyzes the literature on Mensing and the issues
raised by that case with particular attention to those works that have
82 See supra Part I.B.2.
83 Brief for Marc T. Law et al., supra note 11, at 18; see also Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at
67,988 ("[A]s we have learned, brand name drug manufacturers may discontinue marketing
after generic drug entry, FDA believes it is time to provide ANDA holders with the means to
update product labeling to reflect data obtained through postmarketing surveillance .....
84 Lee, supra note 13, at 240-41.
85 See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 579 (2009)); see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013);
Brief for Marc T. Law et al., supra note 11, at 28-29; Lee, supra note 13, at 241; W. Thomas
Smith & Eli G. Phillips, Jr., Generic Liability, or Lack Thereof Under Duty-to-Warn: It's All
About the Labeling, 25 HEALTH LAW. 12, 17 (2012) (stating that failure-to-warn claims against
the manufacturer of a generic drug that has been designated the RLD "have been largely
unsuccessful and repeatedly dismissed"); see also Cooper v. Wyeth, No. 09-929-JJB, 2012 WL
733846, at *7-9 (M.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012); Kurt R. Karst, "RLD Theory of Liability" Continues to
Fall Flat; Multiple Court Decisions Build Momentum in Generic Drug Failure-to-Warn
Preemption Litigation, FDA L. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012, 1:31 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda
law blog.hyman-phelps/2012/03/rld-theory-of-liability-continues-to-fall-flat-multiple-court-
decisions-build-momentum-in-generic-dr.html.
86 PUB. CITIZEN, GENERIC DRUG LABELING 11 (June 2013), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2138.pdf (identifying 434 approved drugs where only a
generic version of the drug is on the market). For the period from January 2008 to March 2013,
the study also "identified 53 drugs for which a black-box warning calling attention to serious or
life-threatening risks was added after generic market entry." Id. at 1, 10; see supra note 11 and
accompanying text; see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2013) (describing "black box" or "boxed"
warnings); Judith E. Beach et al., Black Box Warnings in Prescription Drug Labeling: Results of a
Survey of 206 Drugs, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 403, 410 (1998) ("FDA reserves black box warnings
generally for those situations in which 1) there is a strong clinical database to define the risk or
hazard, and 2) the medical practitioner's attentiveness to the highlighted risk has important
clinical significance that requires the judgment of that practitioner.").
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made specific proposals for legislative or regulatory change.87 This Part
also examines the bills introduced in Congress to legislatively overturn
Mensing, FDA's proposed rule, and the changes that the consumer
advocacy group Public Citizen petitioned FDA to make.
The purpose of this analysis is to identify additional issues that
should be considered in formulating and evaluating any proposed
remedy-not to provide a definitive assessment of the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the existing proposals. It does, however, find
elements of several of the proposals persuasive when viewed against the
twin aims of restoring the protections provided by state failure-to-warn
claims for consumers of generic drugs and remedying the gap in the
regulation of generic drug labeling that exists when the brand-name
version of a drug is no longer marketed.
A. Changes to the Regulation of Generic Drug Labeling
1. Proposals
Much of the literature argues that there is a need to reform the
federal drug-labeling scheme. FDA's proposed rule, the companion
legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
during the 112th Congress, several academic proposals, and Public
Citizen's petition would permit manufacturers to make changes to their
generic drug labeling unilaterally using the Prior Approval Supplement
(PAS) process, the CBE process, or Dear Doctor Letters.88 In contrast,
87 This Article does not consider proposals focused on other potential remedies such as
innovator liability, Court reversal or limitation of the PLIVA holding, waiver of the preemption
defense, or changes to state generic substitution laws. See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Wyeth and
PLIVA: The Law of Inadequate Drug Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 893, 917-24 (2012);
Allen Rostron, Prescription for Fairness: A New Approach to Tort Liability of Brand-Name and
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 60 DUKE L.J. 1123, 1183-90 (2011).
88 See Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d
Sess. 2012); Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, H.R. 4384, 112th Cong. § 2
(2d Sess. 2012); Supplemental Applications Proposed Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs
and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,989 (CBE and Dear Health Care Provider Letters);
Citizen Petition, Pub. Citizen, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0675, at 9-10 (Aug. 29, 2011)
[hereinafter Citizen Petition], available at http://www.regulations.gov/#! document
Detail;D=FDA-201 1-P-0675-0001 (CBE and PAS); Lee, supra 13, at 252-58 (CBE process and
Dear Doctor Letters); Allison Stoddart, Note, Missing After Mensing: A Remedy for Consumers
of Generic Drugs, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1993-96 (2012) (CBE process); Wesley E. Weeks,
Comment, Picking up the Tab for Your Competitors: Innovator Liability After PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2012) (CBE process and Dear Doctor Letters).
In its response to Public Citizen's Citizen Petition, FDA noted that "many of the issues
raised by [the] Petition and the comments submitted to the Petition docket would be more
appropriate to address in the context of the proposed rule." FDA Response to Public Citizen,
supra note 79, at 2; see also Supplemental Applications Proposed Labeling Changes for
Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985. Accordingly, "(t]o the extent
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another proposal (the mandatory-labeling proposal) would make FDA
responsible for writing "all mandatory labels for generic drugs" using
information from a variety of sources including brand-name and
generic drug manufacturers.89
These labeling proposals vary with respect to whether they attempt
to reconcile different warnings between brand-name drugs and generic
drugs, attempt to reconcile different warnings among generic drugs, or
permit continuing differences among the labeling of equivalent
products. A couple of the proposals that generic drug manufacturers be
given control over their labeling also suggest that all manufacturers-
whether brand-name or generic-should be required to match label
changes regardless of the identity of the manufacturer initiating the
change.90 While such proposals could lead to temporary differences
between the labeling of the same drug product, these proposals suggest
that any such differences would be short-lived.91 FDA's proposed rule
would also temporarily permit differences between the labeling of the
brand-name and generic drugs.92 In addition, it appears that it would
temporarily permit differences between the labeling of generic versions
of the same drug.93 The proposed legislation would permit-but not
require-the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to "order conforming changes" to the labeling of
corresponding versions of the drug-whether brand-name or generic-
once a labeling change was made.94 The mandatory-labeling proposal
would require a uniform label for all generic versions of a drug, but is
silent as to whether it would require uniformity between the labeling of
the brand-name and generic versions of a drug.95
In contrast, another proposal states that giving generic drug
manufacturers control over their labeling would lead to chemically
identical drugs having different labels.96 Similarly, the Citizen Petition
does not include a procedure to reconcile differences between the labels
that [the] proposed rule, if finalized, would address some (but not all) of [Public Citizen's]
requested revisions to the regulations," FDA granted the petition in part and denied it in part.
FDA Response to Public Citizen, supra note 79, at 2.
See infra note 267 for a description of FDA's proposed rule.
89 Sarah C. Duncan, Note, Allocating Liability for Deficient Warnings on Generic Drugs: A
Prescription for Change, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 185, 209-10 (2010).
90 See, e.g., Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 919; Stoddart, supra note 88, at 1996.
91 See Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 919. See infra note 267 for a discussion of FDA's proposed
rule and its proposed application to generic drugs.
92 See Supplemental Applications Proposed Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,988.
93 See id. at 67,999.
94 Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess.
2012); Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, H.R. 4384, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d
Sess. 2012).
95 Duncan, supra note 89, at 209-10.
96 Weeks, supra note 88, at 1289.
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of equivalent drug products. Instead, it requests that FDA amend its
regulation that permits withdrawal of an approved ANDA if the labeling
is no longer consistent with that of the RLD so that the regulation does
not apply to a generic manufacturer "permitted to supplement [its]
labeling through CBE or PAS procedures."97
2. Analysis
a. Labeling Responsibility
i. Generic Drug Manufacturers
The proposals that would make generic drug manufacturers
responsible for the labeling of generic drugs and allow them to make
labeling changes would restore the consumer protections provided by
state failure-to-warn claims and eliminate the gap in the regulation of
generic drug labeling that exists when the brand-name version of a drug
is no longer marketed.98 In Mensing, the Supreme Court's preemption
holding was based on its conclusion that the generic drug
manufacturers could not independently change their labels to satisfy
their state-law duty.99 If the generic drug manufacturers could
independently change their generic drug labels under federal law to
satisfy their state-law duty, it would no longer be impossible for these
manufacturers to comply with both state and federal law and the
situation would be similar to that in Wyeth.oo
Allowing generic drug manufacturers to unilaterally update their
generic drug labeling would also eliminate the gap in the current
regulatory scheme because there would always be at least one
manufacturer responsible for a drug's labeling. This would be consistent
with the "central premise of federal drug regulation" described in Wyeth
"that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at
all times." 101
One critique of permitting generic drug manufacturers to
unilaterally update their labeling is that they may over-warn to try to
avoid liability. 102 But if the experience with brand-name manufacturers
post-Wyeth can be used as a guide, this may not be an issue; "in FDA's
97 Citizen Petition, supra note 88, at 1-2.
98 See, e.g., S. 2295; H.R. 4384; Citizen Petition, supra note 88, at 1; Kazhdan, supra note 87,
at 919-20; Lee, supra note 13, at 254-56; Stoddart, supra note 88, at 1993-94; Weeks, supra note
88, at 1289.
99 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011).
100 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 572 (2009).
101 Id. at 570-71.
102 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 89, at 209.
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experience thus far [ Wyeth] has not unleashed a surge of defensive CBE
supplements." 103
ii. FDA
The mandatory-labeling proposall04 is less persuasive than the
proposals that would make generic manufacturers responsible for the
labeling. First, while the mandatory-labeling proposal suggests that the
labeling scheme be coupled with a no-fault trust fund to compensate
those injured by generic drugs,1o5 standing alone, it would not change
the preemption result in Mensing. If only FDA could draft generic drug
labeling, it would still be impossible for manufacturers to independently
change their generic drug labeling.106 Accordingly, the mandatory-
labeling proposal would not restore the layer of consumer protection
that state failure-to-warn claims can provide through its compensatory,
deterrent, and informative functions.
The mandatory-labeling proposal also would not address the
regulatory gap exposed by Mensing. If a brand-name drug leaves the
market after generic entry, the gap where no manufacturer is
responsible for the labeling would remain. While the proposal would
make FDA responsible for the content of the generic labeling in this
situation 107-as well as when the brand-name is on the market-FDA
may not have the resources to effectively update the labeling for all of
the generic drugs on the market. The Court recognized a similar
concern in Wyeth, stating that "[t]he FDA has limited resources to
monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market."108 The resource limitation
concern carries over to the generic drug context, as many brand-name
drugs have generic versions.109 The studies the Court cited in Wyeth in
support of this concern identify issues that are not confined to brand-
name drug regulation-specifically, scientific deficiencies resulting from
increased demands on FDA and resource limitations, and post-market
safety process and data issuesilo-and are sufficient to raise serious
103 U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 34.
104 See Duncan, supra note 89, at 209-10.
105 Id.
106 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011).
107 Duncan, supra note 89, at 209-10.
108 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009); see also id. at 578 n.11.
109 See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 37,
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (arguing on behalf of respondents
that FDA "doesn't have the resources necessary to pay attention to every adverse event report it
gets and every report that is published in the scientific literature").
110 FDA SCI. BD., SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 2 (2007),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b 02_01_fda%20
report%20on%20science%20and%20technology.pdf; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE
FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 193-94
(Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG
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questions about FDA's ability to effectively handle the responsibility of
drafting labels for all generic drugs.InI
b. Uniformity
The proposals differ with respect to whether they contemplate
uniform labeling for different versions of the same drug or permit
continuing labeling differences.112 There are three primary results that
could flow from the proposals. First, the law could require uniform
labeling for all versions of a drug (whether brand-name or generic).113
Second, it could permit the labeling for generic versions of a drug to
differ from the brand-name drug and from each other.114 Third, it could
require uniform generic drug labeling but permit differences between
the labeling of brand-name and generic versions of a drug.115 Regardless
of the degree of uniformity required, the labeling of different versions of
the same drug may differ for a period of time due to a delay between
when one manufacturer changes its labeling and the other
manufacturers make conforming changes.116
Differences in the labeling of different versions of the same drug-
whether continuing or short-lived-have the potential to create
confusion.n7 While this may weigh against creating a drug labeling
system in which labeling differences are permitted to persist, this should
not be a basis for keeping the status quo with respect to generic drug
labeling. The current regulatory system for drug labeling also results in
differences between the labeling of brand-name drugs and their generic
SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT
PROCESS 5 (Mar. 2006).
111 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 55, at 483-86; see also Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466, 2484 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the "important 'complementary' role"
state common law plays to federal drug regulation and the limitations of federal regulatory
review and FDA's resources).
112 See supra Part II.A.
113 See, e.g., Stoddart, supra note 88, at 1994-96.
114 See, e.g., Weeks, supra note 88, at 1289.
115 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 89, at 209-10.
116 See, e.g., Supplemental Applications Proposed Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,998-99 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)(iii), (iv)); Comments of Am. Ass'n for Justice in Response to Citizen
Petition, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0675 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-0675-0007; Kazhdan, supra
note 87, at 919.
117 See, e.g., U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 4 (stating that "FDA places
'a very high priority [on] assuring consistency in labeling,' so as 'to minimize any cause for
confusion among health care professionals and consumers as well as to preclude a basis for lack
of confidence in the equivalency of generic versus brand name products."' (alteration in
original)); Duncan, supra note 89, at 209 (arguing against giving generic manufacturers more
control over the labeling of their drugs because it "would lead to confusing differences in
warning labels, not only between generics and brand-name drugs, but also among generics").
But see Weeks, supra note 88, at 1289-90 (arguing that doctors could evaluate labeling
differences).
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counterparts. A recent study looking at safety labeling consistency
found that "bioequivalent medications frequently differ in their safety
labeling."118 The study suggests that many of these differences may
result from generic drug manufacturers' delays in implementing
labeling changes following a brand-name manufacturer's labeling
update.119 The study noted that "[flrom a practical perspective,
achieving true harmonization across all versions of a drug is a
tremendous challenge," and some delay between the time when a brand-
name manufacturer changes its labeling and when the generic drug
manufacturers update their labeling is inevitable.120 Indeed, FDA
guidance recognizes that generic labeling updates will not be
instantaneous.121 This suggests that reform should seek to decrease the
amount of time between one manufacturer's label change and others'
conforming updates. For example, the proposed legislation would
permit the Secretary to order conforming changes to corresponding
versions of the drug,122 and an academic proposal suggests a regulation
requiring "sameness among all manufacturers' labels."123 Procedural
mechanisms could be used to minimize the period in which labeling
differences persist. For example, a manufacturer that initiates a label
change for a drug could be subject to reporting and notification
requirements, and other manufacturers making versions of that drug-
whether brand-name or generic-could be required to update their
labels within a specific time period following the initial change.124
Permitting generic drug manufacturers to independently change
their labeling may lead to differences among the labeling of different
versions of the same drug and contradict FDA's policy of promoting the
sameness of brand-name and generic drugs.125 But under the current
118 Jon Duke et al., Consistency in the Safety Labeling of Bioequivalent Medications, 22
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 294, 299 (2013).
119 Id. at 300.
120 Id.
121 See id.; FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REVISING ANDA LABELING FOLLOWING
REVISION OF THE RLD LABELING 5 (May 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm072891.pdf (stating that
generic drug labeling revisions to match the labeling of the RLD "should be made at the very
earliest time possible").
122 Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess.
2012); Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, H.R. 4384, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d
Sess. 2012).
123 Stoddart, supra note 88, at 1996.
124 See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,998-99 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)(ii)-(iv)).
125 See, e.g., Comments of Pharm. Assocs., Inc., in Response to Citizen Petition, Docket No.
FDA-2011-P-0675 (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=FDA-201 1-P-0675-0005; see also U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at
4; David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to
Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics
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regulatory system, generic and brand-name versions of a drug are not
the same with respect to an injured person's potential remedies,126
which is not consistent with the principle of sameness. 127 Changing the
preemption result in Mensing by permitting generic manufacturers to
independently change their labeling removes this inconsistency in
potential remedies and is consistent with the principle of sameness.
c. Information
Another critique of making generic manufacturers responsible for
updating the labeling of their generic drugs is that-although it would
give those injured by generic drugs a potential remedy in the form of
state failure-to-warn claims-it would not advance the other purposes
of tort law because "brand-name manufacturers are better positioned to
revise warning labels than generic drug companies." 128 Underlying this
objection is the idea that generic manufacturers do not have the
information needed to meaningfully fulfill new labeling obligations. 129 If
generic manufacturers do not have access to such information, then it
does not make sense to make them responsible for labeling and to use
tort liability to incentivize them to update their labels and to expose
information.130 While it has been argued that generic drug
manufacturers do not have the information needed to meaningfully
fulfill an obligation to update their labels, 131 the focus should be on tools
that would enable generic drug manufacturers to fulfill this obligation
going forward.
and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143 (2005) (quoting an FDA advertisement
for generic drugs as stating, "To make sure your generic drug meets your approval, it first has to
get ours .... We make it tough to become a generic drug in America so it is easy for you to feel
confident.. . . Generic Drugs: Safe. Effective. FDA Approved.").
126 See generally PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009).
127 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2593 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
128 Duncan, supra note 89, at 209; see also Comments of Actavis, Inc., in response to Citizen
Petition, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0675, at 3-5 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Actavis Comment],
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-0675-0008.
129 See Actavis Comment, supra note 128, at 3-5.
130 See supra Part I.C.1.
131 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039,
09-1501) ("Generics don't have a practice-they're not even set up-to go and figure out what
label changes would be appropriate."); Actavis Comment, supra note 128, at 3-5 (arguing that
"ANDA Sponsors Receive Only a Small Fraction of Adverse Reaction Reports Sent and Do Not
Have the Resources to Contextualize Those They Receive"); Lee, supra note 13, at 245 (arguing
that generic drug manufacturers do not have the knowledge base to suggest labeling changes).
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B. Increased Information Sharing and Reporting
1. Proposals
Two of the proposals would couple generic manufacturer labeling
responsibility with additional tools to fulfill that responsibility. One
proposal argues that, in order for generic drug manufacturers to be able
to "make meaningful labeling suggestions, they need complete access to
the clinical, animal, and bioequivalence data submitted in the brand-
name manufacturer's NDA."132 It proposes that generic manufacturers
be given access to-and be required to analyze-"(1) post-approval
safety activities, (2) reports to worldwide regulators, (3) safety-focused
epidemiologic activities, (4) activities required for safety-related labeling
changes, (5) literature review for adverse-event information, and (6)
safety information provided to healthcare professionals."133
Furthermore, the proposal suggests that generic manufacturers be
included in discussions with FDA and the brand-name manufacturer to
discuss labeling revisions once the brand-name manufacturer's patent
expires.134 Another proposal argues that generic drug manufacturers
should be given access to an adverse event reporting database, which
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers would contribute to and
monitor. 135
Although it does not request that generic manufacturers be given
access to additional information to help them fulfill their proposed
labeling obligations, the proposal in Public Citizen's petition would
require generic drug manufacturers to report all clinically significant
hazards to FDA.136
132 Lee, supra note 13, at 252.
133 Id. at 253.
134 Id. at 254.
135 See Stoddart, supra note 88, at 1994-95.
136 Citizen Petition, supra note 88, at 2, 10-11. FDA denied Public Citizen's request "that
FDA amend its regulations to clarify that all ANDA holders are required to report safety
concerns to FDA as soon as they become aware of a clinically significant hazard . . .. because
the current regulations at 21 CFR 314.80 [(Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug
Experiences)], 314.81 [(Other Postmarketing Reports)], and 201.57(c)(6) [(Specific
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products Described in § 201.56(b)(1); Full Prescribing Information; Warnings and
Precautions)] clearly apply to ANDA holders." Response to Public Citizen Petition, supra note
79, at 5.
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2. Analysis
One possible objection to placing increased monitoring or analytic
responsibilities on generic drug manufacturers is that doing so will
increase the price of generic drugs.137 The intent of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, however, was to produce safe and effective drugs-not just cheaper
drugs.138 Furthermore, much of the cost savings for generic drugs is
because the manufacturers must show that their generic drug is
bioequivalent to the RLD and do not have to conduct costly clinical
trials.139 Even if generic drugs had increased regulatory responsibilities
under a revised generic labeling system, these development cost savings
would persist. 140
Brand-name manufacturers and commentators may object to
generic manufacturers accessing data from brand-name manufacturers
because of intellectual property concerns. 141 The disclosure of additional
data, however, may be justified as a means of protecting the public
health. 142 Addressing any concerns will likely require the participation
of both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers.
C. Creation of a No-Fault Generic Trust Fund
1. Proposal
One proposal suggests that, in addition to making FDA responsible
for generic drug labeling, Congress should create a no-fault,
government-administered generic drug trust fund to provide
compensation for unforeseen adverse generic drug reactions.143 The
trust fund would be similar to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
137 See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 89, at 209.
138 Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872, 28,884 (proposed
July 10, 1989) (stating that the purpose of section 505(j) of the FDCA "is to assure the
marketing of generic drugs that are as safe and effective as their brand-name counterparts").
139 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). For example, according to FDA, "[t]he main reason generic
drug companies can market their drugs at lower prices is that they don't face the same
development costs as brand-name companies." Greater Access to Generic Drugs, U.S. FDA (Jan.
2006), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucml43545.htm; see also Lee,
supra note 13, at 252.
140 Lee, supra note 13, at 252.
141 See id.
142 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in
Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483, 490
(2007) (suggesting that "[d]isclosing safety data from clinical trials would allow protection of
most commercially valuable information and better balance our interests in drug innovation
and patient safety"); see also Lee, supra note 13, at 259 (arguing that "Congress did not aim to
bar the public from safety and effectiveness data").
143 Duncan, supra note 89, at 209-15.
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Compensation Program (VICP);14 it would provide a remedy outside of
the tort law system for certain individuals injured by a generic drug
which would be paid for with "minor taxes on generic drugs."145 Under
the VICP, a plaintiff alleging that a vaccine covered by the program
caused harm must file a petition pursuant to the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 (the Vaccine Act), and may
not bring a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer unless certain
conditions are met.146 The generic drug trust fund would "only
compensate individuals for unforeseen adverse reactions" and "cap
compensation, bar punitive damages, and offer the right to accept or
appeal judgments."147
2. Analysis
The proposal that FDA-controlled generic drug labeling be coupled
with a no-fault trust fund for generic drugs may restore one of the
important functions of tort law-the compensation of consumers
injured by generic drugs. 148Despite its statement to the contrary, the
proposal would neither change the preemption result in Mensing nor
incentivize manufacturers to bring to light information that is not
otherwise available to FDA. 149 The proposal advances FDA labeling and
a trust fund for generic drugs as an alternative to the tort law system on
the basis that "in certain critical respects, generic drugs resemble
vaccines."1so Although the proposal acknowledges that differences
between vaccines and generic drugs may make proving causation
difficult in the context of generic drugs, it does not examine or account
for the differences between generic drugs and vaccines that may render
the proposed trust fund for generic drugs unworkable.
First, the public health benefits of vaccines in reducing the
prevalence of preventable diseases have been widely recognized. 151
144 While not entirely clear, the proposal appears to differ from the VICP (which permits a
petitioner to file a civil suit against the vaccine manufacturer after complying with certain
requirements of the Vaccine Act), at least when coupled with the mandatory-labeling proposal,
because it states that use of the FDA labeling would preempt failure-to-warn claims against the
manufacturer. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a) (2012), with Duncan, supra note 89, at 210.
145 Duncan, supra note 89, at 213.
146 Id. at 210-15; 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11.
147 Duncan, supra note 89, at 213-14.
148 See id. at 214. The proposal may not provide all consumers a remedy because the
proposal suggests that "[tihe fund should only compensate individuals for unforeseen adverse
reactions." Id. Thus, a person injured by an inadequate warning on a generic drug where the
adverse reaction was foreseeable would not be eligible for compensation.
149 See id.
150 Id. at 213.
151 See, e.g., Gordon Ada, Vaccines and Vaccination, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1042, 1051
(2001) ("The remarkable success of many vaccines, especially those administered in childhood,
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Vaccines not only offer potential benefits to individuals who are
vaccinated, but (when vaccination rates are high) also provide
community immunity.152 In contrast, generic drugs have a variety of
indications, which are not limited to disease prevention,53 and
discussions of the public health benefits of generic drugs focus on cost
savings and adherence rates. 154
Second, the generic drug market differs from the vaccine market.
Prior to the enactment of the Vaccine Act, one vaccine manufacturer
had temporarily withdrawn from the market, citing the lack of
affordable liability insurance, and there was concern that other vaccine
manufacturers would follow.55 In 1983, "there were only five major
commercial manufacturers of vaccines that are widely used in the
United States."156 Accordingly, there was concern that if any of the
manufacturers left the market it "could create a genuine public health
hazard"-"vaccine shortages,.. . increasing numbers of unimmunized
children, and, perhaps, a resurgence of preventable diseases."157 Even
today the number of vaccines licensed in the United States is limited,
and there is only a single sponsor for many of the vaccines.1 8 In
and their impressive safety record, together with the eradication of smallpox, are regarded
among the greatest public health achievements of the 20th century."); Saad B. Omer et al.,
Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2009) (stating that "[v]accines are among the most effective tools
available for preventing infectious diseases" and that "[hligh immunization coverage has
resulted in drastic declines in vaccine-preventable diseases").
152 Community Immunity ("Herd" Immunity), NAT'L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS
DISEASES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/pages/communityimmunity.aspx
("When a critical portion of a community is immunized against a contagious disease, most
members of the community are protected against that disease because there is little opportunity
for an outbreak" and "[elven those who are not eligible for certain vaccines ... get some
protection because the spread of contagious disease is contained.").
153 The FDA maintains a searchable database of drugs which contains information about
brand-name and generic drugs approved by FDA. See Drugs@FDA, U.S. FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
154 See, e.g., GENERIC PHARM. ASS'N (GPHA), GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. (4th ed.
2012), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media//cms/IMSStudyAug20l2WEB.pdf;
William H. Shrank et al., The Implications of Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred
Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 332, 332-37 (2006) (finding that prescribing generic drugs is associated with
improvements in medication adherence).
155 H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 6-7 (Sept. 26, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6347-
48; see also Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 788 n.11 (2011) ("Prior to the passage of the Vaccine Act, the
persistent threat of tort liability claims caused pharmaceutical companies to consider and
threaten to abandon the vaccine market, and some had already done so. There was real concern
that there might be no manufacturers for certain vaccines in the United States.").
156 Walter A. Orenstein et al., Immunizations in the United States: Success, Structure, and
Stress, 24 HEALTH AFF. 599, 603 (2005).
157 H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7.
158 See id.; Complete List of Vaccines Licensed for Immunization and Distribution in the US,
U.S. FDA (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/Approved
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contrast, the current generic drug market appears to be growing,159 the
number of approved generic drugs is much greater,o60 and multiple
manufacturers often make generic versions of a single drug.161 In
addition, the indications for generic drugs are diverse and include both
potentially lifesaving drugs and drugs for less serious conditions. 162
The differences between vaccines and generic drugs are significant
for the no-fault trust fund proposal. The VICP distinguishes between
"Table" and "off-Table" injuries. 163 The vaccine injury table (the Table)
lists illnesses, disabilities, injuries, and conditions that are presumed to
have been caused by the listed vaccine if the claimant can show that the
injury or condition occurred within the specified time frame. 164
Currently, there are seventeen categories of vaccines listed on the
Table. 165 If the injury or condition is not on the Table or did not occur
within the specified time period, the claimant must prove that the
Products/ucm093833.htm; see also Aaron Kesselheim, Safety, Supply, and Suits-Litigation and
the Vaccine Industry, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485,1486 (2011).
159 See generally SOPHIA SNYDER, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 32541b: GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING IN THE US 14 (June 2012) [hereinafter GENERIC INDUSTRY
REPORT] (discussing growth in the generic drug industry).
160 See, e.g., ANDA (Generic) Drug Approvals, U.S. FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/drugandbiologicapproval
reports/andagenericdrugapprovals/default.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2014); Drugs@FDA, supra
note 153 (search original abbreviated new drug approvals (ANDAs) by month).
161 See FDA, FACTS ABOUT GENERIC DRUGS 3 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understanding
GenericDrugs/UCM305908.pdf.
162 Two examples serve to illustrate the diversity of generic drug indications. Lamivudine, an
antiretroviral agent for the treatment of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV-1), and
Finasteride, a drug for the treatment of male pattern hair loss, have both been approved by the
FDA in generic form. Drugs@FDA, supra note 153 (search "lamivudine" and "finasteride"); see,
e.g., APOTEX CORP., Lamivudine, FDA ONLINE LABEL REPOSITORY (Aug. 2013),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/spl/data/c4fb4148-5693-f27c-ff69-adc02 1f93091/c4fb4148-5693-
f27c-ff69-adc021f93091.xml (ANDA No. 091606); DR. REDDY'S LABS. LTD., Finasteride, FDA
ONLINE LABEL REPOSITORY (Aug. 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/spl/data/0917aaac-
8122-3208-97f8-33205bc7dbb2/0917aaac-8122-3208-97f8-33205bc7dbb2.xml (ANDA No.
076436); Press Release, Dr. Reddy's, Dr. Reddy's Announces the Launch of Finasteride Tablets
(Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.drreddys.com/media/popups/02-jan-2013.html. The
diversity of generic drug indications raises the question of whether all drug injuries should be
treated the same. For example, should the program cover equally a generic drug that is
indicated to treat male patterned baldness and a potentially lifesaving antiretroviral generic
drug for the treatment of HIV? And, if not, is there a principled and workable way to
distinguish between different generic drugs? Furthermore, if generics are covered by a non-
fault trust, should this protection be expanded to brand-name drugs-the manufacturers of
which invest substantial resources in developing the new drug products in the first place-or
other products, whether FDA-regulated or not?
163 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- 11 (2012) (describing the process of filing petitions for compensation
for vaccine-related injuries); Meyers, supra note 155, at 796-98 (discussing the vaccine injury
table and its significance in the VICP).
164 See 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2013) (Vaccine Injury Table).
165 Id.
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vaccine caused the injury or condition.166 In effect, the Table makes it
easier for some claimants to prove that vaccine caused the injury and,
accordingly, to get compensation. 167
Creating a similar table for generic drugs is likely to be challenging
due to the number of generic drugs and, as the proposal recognizes, the
"many confounding factors [that] could contribute to an adverse
reaction."168 Thus, many of the claims in a generic drug no-fault trust
fund likely would be off-Table.169 If the trust fund were restricted to
cover only "unforeseen adverse reactions" (as proposed),70 all of the
claims would be off-Table claims. This is significant because it has been
argued that the shift to off-Table claims in the VICP has contributed to
"serious problems" and that the VICP does not meet the needs of
potential claimants who may have been injured by vaccines.171 The no-
fault generic drug trust fund proposal does not address these critiques
and challenges. Significant differences in the public health benefits of
vaccines and generic drugs, the markets for such products, and the array
of indications approved for such products, as well as critiques of the
VICP, weigh against creating a no-fault trust fund for generic drugs.
D. Summary: Issues for Consideration
The analysis of the proposals suggests that, in addition to restoring
the protections that state failure-to-warn claims provide for consumers
of generic drugs and eliminating the gap in the regulation of generic
drug labeling that exists when the brand-name version of a drug is no
longer marketed, there are several other issues that should be considered
and addressed in any proposal. These issues include: (1) who should be
able to make labeling changes and under what circumstances; (2) how to
encourage appropriate and timely warnings; (3) whether and how to
reconcile differences between the labeling of different versions of a drug
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11, -13; see Meyers, supra note 155, at 798.
167 See Meyers, supra note 155, at 798.
168 Duncan, supra note 89, at 214.
169 Indeed, in recent years, "almost 90% of the petitions filed [under the VICP] assert only
non-Table injuries." Meyers, supra note 155, at 798.
170 Duncan, supra note 89, at 214.
171 Meyers, supra note 155, at 788, 791, 799-806 (arguing that, while the interests of vaccine
manufacturers, healthcare providers, and federal health care agencies have largely been met by
the Vaccine Act, which created the VICP, "[flor persons who may have been injured by
vaccinations, the need for expeditious, generous, and predictable compensation remains
unmet.... [T]he process of adjudicating vaccine cases today is seriously flawed and in need of
repair."); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8, VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION: PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 12-14 (Dec.
1999); Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its Influence During the Last Two Decades,
111 PENN ST. L. REV. 681, 717-21 (2007) (examining criticisms of the VICP).
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after a labeling change; and (4) whether there is a need for increased
information sharing, reporting, or producing in order for
manufacturers to fulfill any new regulatory responsibilities.
III. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
This Article began by identifying issues in generic drug regulation
that flow from and are highlighted by the Mensing decision. It then
critiqued several proposals to address those issues. In so doing, it
identified additional issues for consideration in any reform. This Part
provides an overview of negotiated rulemaking and the academic
literature on negotiated rulemaking. It also examines FDA's lack of
experience with negotiated rulemaking. Part IV then builds on this Part
to argue that FDA should employ negotiated rulemaking to address the
identified issues.
A. History and Background
Negotiated rulemaking-also called regulatory negotiation or "reg-
neg"l72-developed in response to the increasingly formal and
adversarial notice-and-comment rulemaking process.173 In 1982, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (the Conference)
recommended procedures for negotiating proposed regulations "with a
view to minimizing protracted adversary proceedings and litigation"
and creating "an improved process and better rules."74 The Conference
172 See, e.g., DAVID M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 1 (1995) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]
(discussing the terminology for negotiated rulemaking); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors:
The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 n.1 (same);
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008) (noting that "'regulatory negotiation' or simply 'reg-
neg"' are alternative terms for negotiated rulemaking).
173 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing informal or "notice and comment" rulemaking
procedures); Recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,708
(July 15, 1982) (discussing the formalization of the rulemaking process and the adverse
consequences arising as a result); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise,
71 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (1982) (discussing the evolution of the regulatory process and arguing that
negotiated rulemaking is preferable to the adversarial process); see also Siobhan Mee,
Comment, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOS): Consensus Saves
Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 245 (1997) (discussing the Combined Sewer
Overflows negotiated rulemaking and concluding that the negotiations created a consensus that
"prevented ossification").
174 Recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. at 30,701, 30,709; see
also 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1983). The Conference is an independent federal agency intended to
improve the regulatory process. See 5 U.S.C. § 591. Congress defunded the agency in 1995.
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
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also urged Congress to pass legislation authorizing agencies to conduct
regulatory negotiation.175
The Conference's 1982 recommendation was based on a report
prepared by Philip Harter.176 That same year, Harter published a
seminal law review article proposing negotiated rulemaking-the
development of "rules through negotiation among interested parties"-
as an alternative to traditional informal notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 177 The informal rulemaking process, Harter argued, had become
mired in a "malaise."178 Harter described aspects of the rulemaking
process as having become "bitterly adversarial," and argued that while
the adversarial process has benefits in the form of information
generation, "quality control," and participation, it also has many
drawbacks.179 Harter argued that it forces participants to take and
defend "extreme positions," affects both the selection and presentation
of issues, is not suited to "resolving polycentric disputes," encourages
defensive factual research, relies heavily on intermediaries, and may
create a "perceived lack of legitimacy" in the final rule and decrease
104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 480 (1995); see also Gary J. Edles, The Continuing Need for an
Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 101 (1998) (discussing the functions of the
Conference and its demise); Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19 (1998) (exploring the demise
of the Conference). The agency was subsequently refunded in 2009. See Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 656; Regulatory Improvement Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-290, 122 Stat. 2914 (2008) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 596); see also Gary J.
Edles, The Revival of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 12 TEx. TECH ADMIN.
L.J. 281 (2011) (discussing the revival of the Conference).
175 Recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. at 30,709. In 1985, the
Conference provided additional recommendations on the procedures for negotiated proposed
regulations. Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895
(Dec. 27, 1985); see also 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5 (1986).
176 Harter, supra note 173; see also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 414 (listing Harter
article and background report).
177 Harter, supra note 173, at 28; see also Danielle Holley-Walker, The Importance of
Negotiated Rulemaking to the No Child Left Behind Act, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1015, 1036-41 (2007).
In notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is governed by § 553 of the APA, an agency
must publish an NPRM in the Federal Register, which must be followed by a period of time for
comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also "Informal Rulemaking" Under Administrative Procedure Act,
Drug & Cosm. L. Rptr. (CCH), 2077 (2013), available at 2013 WL 6021251. If, after
considering all of the submitted comments, the agency decides to promulgate a final regulation,
it must include a "concise general" statement of the "basis and purpose" of the rule. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c). As a result of judicially imposed obligations on notice-and-comment rulemaking,
which have "provided parties who are interested in the outcome of a rulemaking a powerful
incentive to submit voluminous comments that include multiple objections, criticisms, and
proposed alternatives," agencies have "had to issue 'concise, general' statements of basis and
purpose hundreds of pages long addressing at length the scores of issues raised in comments."
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185,
192-93 (1996).
178 Harter, supra note 173, at 6.
179 Id. at 18-19.
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"voluntary compliance." 180 This process, Harter noted, leaves businesses,
beneficiaries of regulations, and federal agencies dissatisfied. 181
Harter argued that negotiated rulemaking has significant
"advantages over the adversarial process."82 Negotiation, Harter
asserted, permits participants to focus on maximizing their interests
rather than staking out extreme positions.183 He also argued that
negotiation can be less costly and time-intensive than the conventional
rulemaking process, permit participants to create "workable solutions,"
and increase the legitimacy of the final rule.184 However, Harter
recognized that negotiation is not appropriate for all rulemaking. 185
Harter identified several factors that, while not determinative, may
help guide the determination of whether negotiations are appropriate:186
The parties must believe that participation is in their best interests and
no party should have the power to impose its will on the others.187 In
addition, the number of parties should be limited; the issues to be
resolved concrete and ready for resolution; a decision inevitable or even
imminent; the dispute capable of being "transformed into a 'win/win'
situation" for the parties; the parties able to agree on fundamental
principles; the number of issues sufficient to permit trade-offs; the
"[rjesearch [n]ot [d]eterminative of [the o]utcome"; and the
implementation of the negotiated agreement likely.188 Harter
emphasized the importance of identifying the interests that should be
represented in the negotiations, identifying appropriate representatives
of such interests, and obtaining their participation.189 He argued that the
federal agency participation in negotiated rulemaking is appropriate and
may be beneficial to the agency.190 He also suggested processes for
assembling negotiators, conducting negotiations, and reporting an
agreement. 191
B. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act
In 1990, the NRA was enacted to create a framework for the
negotiated rulemaking process and "to encourage agencies to use the
180 Id. at 19-22.
181 Id. at 24.
182 Id. at 28.
183 Id. at 29.
184 Id. at 28, 30-31.
185 Id. at 42.
186 Id. at 42-52.
187 Id. at 45-46.
l8S Id. at 46-52.
189 Id. at 52-57.
190 Id. at 57-67.
191 Id. at 67-102. He also discussed judicial review of negotiated rules. Id. at 102-07.
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process when it enhances the informal rulemaking process."92 The
NRA defines "negotiated rulemaking" as rulemaking using a "negotiated
rulemaking committee,"l93 which is an advisory committee established
in accordance with the NRA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) "to consider and discuss issues for the purpose of reaching a
consensus in the development of a proposed rule."194 The NRA was
intended "to provide some basic ground rules and safeguards" for
negotiated rulemaking and "was not intended to create new
authority."95 An agency's use of a negotiated rulemaking committee
must comply with the FACA-which establishes standards and
procedures for the "establishment, operation, administration, and
duration of advisory committees"-except as otherwise provided by the
NRA. 196 For example, the NRA provides that, notwithstanding the
FACA, an agency may nominate a person to serve as a facilitator for the
committee negotiations.197 If the committee does not approve any
agency nominee for facilitator, the committee must select a facilitator by
consensus. 19 8 The NRA's provisions are specifically directed to
negotiation and consensus as part of the rulemaking process. 199
Pursuant to the NRA, negotiated rulemaking proceeds in several
steps.200 Before an agency can establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee, its head must determine "that the use of the negotiated
rulemaking procedure is in the public interest."201 In making this
determination, the agency must consider whether: (1) the rule is needed;
(2) "there are a limited number of identifiable interests that will be
significantly affected by the rule"; (3) it is reasonably likely "that a
committee can be convened with a balanced representation of persons
192 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648 § 3, 104 Stat. 4969, 4970
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70a (2012)).
193 5 U.S.C. § 562(6) (2012).
194 Id. § 562(7); see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15.
195 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 67; Negotiated Rulemaking Act, § 2, 104 Stat. at 4969
("Agencies have the authority to establish negotiated rulemaking committees under the laws
establishing such agencies and their activities and under the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.").
196 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2(b)(4); 5 U.S.C. §§ 564(a), 565(a), 566(d); see also Procedures for
Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52895 (Dec. 27, 1985) ("[I]t appears
that caucuses and other working group meetings [in a negotiated rulemaking] may be held in
private, where this is necessary to promote an effective exchange of views."); Steven P. Croley,
Practical Guidance on the Applicability of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 111, 121 (1996) (indicating that regulatory negotiation under the NRA triggers FACA).
197 5 U.S.C. § 566(c); see also id. app. 2 § 10(e).
198 Id. § 566(c).
199 See id. §§ 561-570a.
200 The NRA establishes a framework for the process and is not intended "to limit
innovation and experimentation with the negotiated rulemaking process." Id. § 561.
201 Id. § 563. The agency may use a "convener," a person who assists it in "identifying
persons who will be significantly affected by a proposed rule" and determining whether
negotiated rulemaking is feasible and appropriate. Id. §§ 562(3), 563.
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who ... can adequately represent the [identified]
interests ... and .. . are willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a
consensus on the proposed rule"; (4) it is reasonably likely that a
committee will reach such a consensus "within a fixed period of time";
(5) the "procedure will not unreasonably delay the notice of proposed
rulemaking and the issuance of the final rule"; (6) "the agency has
adequate resources... [that it] is willing to commit... to the
committee"; and (7) "the agency, to the maximum extent possible
consistent with [its] legal obligations... will use the consensus of the
committee with respect to the proposed rule as the basis for the rule
proposed by the agency for notice and comment."202
If the agency decides to establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee, it must publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing
its intention to do so and provide a period for the submission of
comments and applications for membership on the committee.203 The
agency may establish a negotiated rulemaking committee if it
determines that such a committee "can adequately represent the
interests that will be significantly affected by a proposed rule and that it
is feasible and appropriate in the particular rulemaking."204 The
committee, including the agency representatives, must negotiate to
attempt to reach a consensus on a proposed rule.205 If the committee
reaches a consensus on a proposed rule, it must provide the agency with
a report and the proposed rule.206 If it is unable to reach such a
consensus, the committee may provide a report on any areas of
consensus. 207 Negotiated rulemaking supplements informal rulemaking
under the APA: A rule based on the committee's consensus that is
proposed by an agency is still subject to the rulemaking requirements in
§ 553 of the APA.208 The committee terminates when the final rule is
promulgated unless an earlier date is set forth according to the
provisions of the NRA.209 While agency actions "relating to establishing,
assisting, or terminating a negotiated rulemaking committee" are not
subject to judicial review, rules created by negotiated rulemaking are
subject to judicial review and are not given "any greater deference by a
202 Id. § 563.
203 Id. § 564.
204 Id. § 565(a)(1).
205 Id. § 566(a). "Consensus" is defined as "unanimous concurrence" unless the committee
"agrees to define [it as] ... a general but not unanimous concurrence; or... agrees upon
another specified definition." Id. § 562(2).
206 Id. § 566(f).
207 Id.
208 See id. § 561; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 2 ("Negotiated rulemaking should be
viewed as supplement to the rulemaking provisions of the [APA]."). See supra note 177 for a
discussion of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
209 5 U.S.C. § 567.
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court than a rule which is the product of other rulemaking
procedures."210
C. The Debate Concerning Negotiated Rulemaking
Although negotiated rulemaking has been used infrequently,211 it
has been the subject of ongoing debate. Following Harter's first article
on negotiated rulemaking, there has been substantial academic literature
in support of negotiated rulemaking;212 however, there also has been
literature critiquing negotiated rulemaking.213 Commentators are
divided over questions of the legitimacy, benefits, and effectiveness of
negotiated rulemaking: Supporters of negotiated rulemaking have
argued that negotiated rulemaking may further legitimacy and
accountability.214 Critics have countered that it lacks legitimacy and
undermines the public interest with private bargaining.215
210 Id. § 570.
211 See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1276, 1277 tbl.2 (1997) (finding that from 1983 to 1996,
negotiated rulemaking overall has accounted for less than one-tenth of one percent of final
rules); see also Lubbers, supra note 172, at 1007-17 (listing negotiated rulemaking committees
formed or announced from January 1, 1990 to December 1, 2007).
212 See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and
the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1353 (1997) (describing the literature
on negotiated rulemaking up until the time of his article as "[v]irtually all ... supportive").
213 See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 211, at 1316-17 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking has
not decreased rulemaking time or litigation); Funk, supra note 212, at 1356 (arguing that
negotiated rulemaking subverts the agency's pursuit of the public interest and replaces it with
"privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law"); William Funk, When
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 66-78, 92-96 (1987) (arguing that EPA's regulatory negotiation of
woodstove standards had "grave legal infirmities" and substantive problems and turned the
agency's role as the representative of the public interest "on its head"); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206,
1211 (1994) ("[Rlegulatory negotiation is not democratically legitimate unless all interested
parties are adequately represented. Agreement among only the subset of interests that have
organized advocates is not sufficient.").
214 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543,
548-49, 666 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, The Private Role] (proposing a conception of
administration that views administrative power as a set of negotiated relationships between
public and private actors and arguing that "formal legal procedures and agency oversight may
provide the appearance of adequate accountability, but a variety of other mechanisms and an
array of private parties play an important and undervalued role in legitimizing public/private
arrangements"); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative Governance] (discussing
accountability in a collaborative system and arguing that there is a need to go beyond
traditional notions of accountability and experiment); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein,
Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 60 (2000)
(summarizing and analyzing empirical evidence on negotiated rulemaking); Harter, supra note
173, at 22, 31, 69, 84, 94 (arguing that the perceived lack of legitimacy resulting from an
adversarial rulemaking process may decrease voluntary compliance and that consensus may
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There has also been debate over the potential benefits of negotiated
rulemaking (such as decreased rulemaking time and fewer judicial
challenges to rules) and whether negotiated rulemaking has been
successful in producing those benefits. One scholar, Cary Coglianese,
challenged the "promise" of negotiated rulemaking as initially described
by Harter, concluding that it has not sped up rulemaking or reduced
litigation.216 Harter countered that Coglianese's conclusion was based
on research that was "significantly flawed, and hence misleading."217
Harter argued that negotiated rulemaking has decreased both
rulemaking time and litigation relative to traditional rulemaking.218
Furthermore, he argued that the central aim of negotiated rulemaking is
to create better and more widely accepted rules:219 in negotiated
rulemaking, benefits "flow[] from the participation of those affected,
who bring with them a practical insight and expertise that can result in
rules that are better informed, more tailored to achieving the actual
regulatory goal, and hence, more effective and more enforceable."220
When viewed through this lens, Harter argued, negotiated rulemaking
has been "remarkably successful in fulfilling its promise" as participants
have identified a range of positive values.221 In support of the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking, Harter referred to a study of negotiated
rulemaking versus conventional rulemaking by Laura I. Langbein and
Cornelius M. Kerwin.222 The study authors stated that there was "strong
but qualified support for the continued use of negotiated rule
making."223 In an article summarizing and analyzing that study, Jody
Freeman and Langbein noted that, according to study participants,
negotiated rulemaking produces "more learning, better quality rules,
and higher satisfaction compared to conventional rulemaking."224 In
confer added legitimacy on a rule); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and
Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 133 (1985) (examining the
Environmental Protection Agency's first two negotiated rulemakings and concluding that the
process, with some refinements, "appears to hold great promise for remedying the crisis of
regulatory legitimacy").
215 See, e.g., Funk, supra note 213, at 57; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 213, at 1208-12.
216 Coglianese, supra note 211, at 1335-36.
217 Harter, supra note 172, at 40.
218 Id. at 45-52.
219 Id. at 52-54.
220 Id. at 53-54.
221 Id. at 33.
222 Id. at 55.
223 Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional
Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
599, 625 (2000). The authors found that the overall assessments of participants in negotiated
rulemaking were "significantly more positive than those of participants in conventional rule
making." Id. at 626. With respect to the question of whether negotiated rulemaking reduces
litigation, the authors found that "negotiated rules appear no more (or less) subject to litigation
than conventional rules." Id. at 625.
224 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 62.
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addition, negotiated rulemaking "reduced conflict between the regulator
and regulated entities," "was no less fair to regulated entities than
conventional rulemaking," and "increase[d] legitimacy."225 Freeman has
further argued that negotiated rulemaking may "facilitate policy
implementation or improve relationships among repeat players,
producing payoffs down the line."226
D. FDA and Negotiated Rulemaking
To date, FDA has not used or been required by Congress to use the
negotiated rulemaking process set forth in the NRA.227 The other major
health and safety agencies,228 however, have used negotiated
rulemaking,229 as have other entities within HHS.230 Despite having not
225 Id. at 63. There were, however, some weaknesses of negotiated rulemaking, including
"the disproportionate costs it imposes on smaller groups with comparatively fewer resources."
Id.
226 Freeman, The Private Role, supra note 214, at 656-57.
227 Because the NRA requires that an agency must announce its intention to establish a
negotiated rulemaking committee in the Federal Register, see 5 U.S.C. § 564(a) (2012), if FDA
had formed a negotiated rulemaking committee, there would have been a notice in the Federal
Register to that effect. A search of the Federal Register, however, revealed no such notices. See
also Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking: The Next Step in Regulatory Innovation at the Food
and Drug Administration?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 425 (2010). In addition, searches of the
FDCA and the U.S. Public Laws and Statutes at Large revealed no instances in which Congress
had required FDA to conduct negotiated rulemaking. See id.
The Senate clinical trial reporting bill would have required FDA to use negotiated
rulemaking to determine the information and trials to be reported to the clinical trial register,
but the final act, the FDAAA, did not. See id.; see also Food and Drug Administration
Revitalization Act, S. 1082, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). That Congress did not include
negotiated rulemaking in the final act, however, should not weigh against using negotiation in
the current situation. As Freeman has argued, legislation specifically authorizing an agency to
use negotiated rulemaking "may actually be an obstacle to collaboration," and "might
undermine local efforts at problem-solving and institutional design." Freeman, Collaborative
Governance, supra note 214, at 92.
228 See About OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
http://www.osha.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) (stating that OSHA's mission is "to
assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women by setting and
enforcing standards and by providing training, outreach, education and assistance"); NHTSA's
Core Values, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/About
+NHTSA/NHTSA%27s+Core+Values (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) (stating that NHTSA's
mission is to "[slave lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to road traffic
crashes, through education, research, safety standards and enforcement activity"); Our Mission
and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-
and-what-we-do (last updated Mar. 16, 2014) ("The mission of EPA is to protect human health
and the environment.").
229 See Coglianese, supra note 211, at 1274 tbl.1, 1277 tbl.2 (listing pending and final
negotiated rulemakings, including rulemakings of EPA and OSHA, and tallying agencies' use of
negotiated rulemaking from 1983 to 1996); Lubbers, supra note 172, at 1007-17 (listing
negotiated rulemaking committees formed or announced from January 1, 1990 to December 1,
2007, including committees formed for EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA).
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used negotiated rulemaking, FDA has shown a willingness to
experiment with other possible alternatives to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, including informal guidance,231 which (like negotiated
230 See Lubbers, supra note 172, at 1007-17; see also Medicare Program; Establishment of
Special Payment Provisions and Standards for Suppliers of Prosthetics and Certain Custom-
Fabricated Orthotics; Intent to Form Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 67 Fed. Reg. 13,297,
13,297 (Mar. 22, 2002) (announcing the intent of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to form statutorily mandated negotiated rulemaking committee); Medicare
Program: Ambulance Fee Schedule; Intent to Form Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 64 Fed.
Reg. 3474 (Jan. 22, 1999) (announcing the intent of the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) to form a statutorily mandated negotiated rulemaking committee); Medicare Program;
Coverage and Administrative Policies for Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests; Intent to Form
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,166 (June 3, 1998) (announcing the intent
of the HCFA to form a statutorily mandated negotiated rulemaking committee); Health Care
Programs, Fraud and Abuse; Intent to Form the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee for the
Shared Risk Exception, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,410 (May 23, 1997) (announcing the intent of the Office
of Inspector General of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to form a statutorily
mandated negotiated rulemaking committee); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act Amendments, 61 Fed. Reg. 32,482 (June 24, 1996) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 900)
(promulgating final rules for joint Department of Interior (DOI) and HHS statutorily required
negotiated rulemaking); Hospice Services Under Medicare Program; Intent to Form Negotiated
Rulemaking Committee, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,129 (Oct. 14, 1994) (announcing proposal of the
HCFA to use negotiated rulemaking).
231 Informal guidance-"informal agency advice that influences regulated entities but does
not carry the force and effect of law"-has been described as FDA's "policymaking weapon of
choice." K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 507-08
(2011); see also Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 783 n.1, 788-89 (2010) (discussing the meaning of "guidance
document"). FDA has undertaken reforms of its informal guidance in part aimed at "allowing
for greater public participation and clarity in the policymaking process." Lewis, supra, at 523;
see also Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 166-70 (2000). Questions remain, however, as to whether
FDA has fully achieved that goal. Lewis, supra, at 523. As K.M. Lewis notes, "even though
[FDA's Good Guidance Practices] allow for greater public participation, industry
representatives still have less ability to provide input on the policies that will ultimately control
their operations than [they] would obtain if FDA used notice-and-comment rulemaking," and
"regulatory beneficiaries are less likely to involve themselves in guidance development than
regulated businesses because the marginal benefit to any one individual from any given change
in regulatory policy is unlikely to outweigh the costs of organizing." Lewis, supra at 541-42. In
addition, there are still unsettled questions about the effect of guidance documents on the
agency and the level of deference that courts should give to such documents. Id.; see also 21
C.F.R. § 10.115 (2013) (describing good guidance practices).
FDA has also experimented with the streamlined processes of direct final rulemaking and
interim-final rulemaking. See Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking]; Ronald M. Levin, More on Direct
Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 767 (1999)
[hereinafter Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking]. Direct final rulemaking is "a variation on
the normal notice-and-comment model of informal rulemaking," in which "an agency
publishes a rule in the Federal Register with a statement that the rule will become effective
unless the agency receives an adverse comment or a written notice that someone intends to
submit an adverse comment." Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, supra, at 1; see also Adoption of
Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110-11 (Aug. 18, 1995) (promulgating the
Conference's recommendation that agencies may want to use direct final rulemaking for rules
developed through negotiated rulemaking). One analysis of direct final rulemaking at FDA
noted that between 1997 and 2008, FDA had proposed direct final rulemaking for thirty-eight
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rulemaking) can be viewed as a return to setting policy in less formal
ways. 232
FDA has expressed openness to at least considering the use of
negotiated rulemaking.233 FDA's regulations contain one reference to
negotiated rulemaking: the regulations setting forth the required
content of a petition to establish or amend a reference amount
customarily consumed per eating occasion-which is used to determine
serving sizes of foods.234 These require that a petitioner include a
statement in its petition "concerning the feasibility of convening
associations, corporations, consumers, and other interested parties to
engage in negotiated rulemaking to develop a proposed rule consistent
rules. Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct Final
Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 93 (2009). That analysis also found that, rather than using
direct final rulemaking for noncontroversial rules (as intended), FDA has instead "often used
direct final rulemaking for the opposite: regulations that may be expected to be controversial."
Id. at 79; see also Guidance for FDA and Industry: Direct Final Rule Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg.
62,466 (Nov. 21, 1997) (announcing availability of guidance); FDA, GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND
INDUSTRY, DIRECT FINAL RULE PROCEDURES (Nov. 21, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucml25166.htm (describing FDA's direct final rulemaking
procedures); see generally Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 401,423-28 (1999).
Interim-final rulemaking occurs when an agency adopts a rule that becomes effective
without prior notice and public comment and invites public comment after the rule becomes
effective. Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 43,111-12; Michael Asimow, Interim-
Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703 (1999) (considering the legal issues
arising out of the use of interim-final rules and making recommendations for improvements to
the process). A search of the Federal Register identified a number of instances in which FDA
has promulgated interim final rules. See, e.g., Establishment, Maintenance, and Availability of
Records: Amendment to Record Availability Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,658 (Feb. 23, 2012)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1); Exceptions or Alternatives to Labeling Requirements for Products
Held by the Strategic National Stockpile, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,589 (Dec. 28, 2007) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 312, 314, 601, 610, 801, 807, 809, 812, 814); Food Labeling: Health Claims; Plant
Sterol/Stanol Esters and Coronary Heart Disease, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,686 (Sept. 8, 2000) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); Fees for Certification of Drugs Composed Wholly or Partly of Insulin, 60
Fed. Reg. 56,515 (Nov. 9, 1995); see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(e) (providing that FDA's regulations
regarding notice and public procedure in 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(b) do not apply when FDA
"determines for good cause that they are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest"); Administrative Functions, Practices, and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 4680 (Jan. 25,
1977) (notice of final rule); Administrative Practices and Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,682,
40,689 (proposed Sept. 3, 1975) (notice of proposed rulemaking for 21 C.F.R. § 2.10, which
subsequently became 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(e)).
232 See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 231, at 166 (describing negotiated rulemaking, interpretative
rules, and guidance as part of the trend toward informality following the ossification of notice-
and-comment rulemaking); see also Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, supra note 231, at 1-2.
233 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h). Recent presidential administrations have expressed support for
negotiated rulemaking. See Exec. Order No. 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740 (Oct. 4, 1993) ("Each agency ... is directed to explore and,
where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, including
negotiated rulemaking.").
234 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h).
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with the [NRA]."235 While several companies have submitted
petitions,236 FDA does not appear to have formed a negotiated
rulemaking committee to develop a proposed rule in response to such a
petition.237
The reference to negotiated rulemaking in FDA's food labeling
regulations came about as a result of FDA's efforts to reform the food
labeling system. 238 In late 1989, FDA issued an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking seeking public comment on various aspects of
food labeling,239 which it followed the next year with a proposed rule.240
Following FDA's proposal, however, there were two developments that
shaped the course of its rulemaking: the publication of a report by the
National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine on nutrition
labeling and the enactment of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
of 1990 (NLEA).241 In light of the NLEA, FDA re-proposed its proposed
regulation, noting that there were some differences between the NLEA
and FDA's earlier proposal as well as some questions.242 In the preamble
to the second proposed regulation, FDA noted that members of the food
industry had commented that FDA had developed the 1990 proposal
without input from industry and that "[o]ne company [had] suggested
negotiated rulemaking on serving sizes to reach a consensus."243 FDA
responded that "negotiated rulemaking was not a practical option," in
part due to time constraints imposed by the NLEA, and noted that it
235 Id. § 101.12(h)(14).
236 See Food Labeling; Serving Sizes; Reference Amount for Baking Powder, Baking Soda,
and Pectin, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,887 (Mar. 16, 1999) (referencing petition from Church Dwight Co.
(Docket No. 94P-0240)); Food Labeling; Serving Sizes; Reference Amounts for Candies, 63 Fed.
Reg. 1078 (proposed Jan. 8, 1998) (referencing petitions from Nutrition Research Group and
Andes Candies, Inc. (Docket No. 96P-0023) and the Chocolate Manufacturers Association
(Docket No. 96P-0179)), withdrawn, Withdrawal of Certain Proposed Rules and Other
Proposed Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,831 (Nov. 26, 2004); Food Labeling; Serving Sizes; Reference
Amount and Serving Size Declaration for Hard Candies, Breath Mints, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,775
(proposed Dec. 30, 1997) (referencing petition from Ferrero USA (Docket No. 94P-0168));
Food Labeling; Serving Sizes; Reference Amount for Salt, Salt Substitutes, Seasoning Salts (e.g.,
Garlic Salt), 62 Fed. Reg. 63,647 (Dec. 2, 1997) (referencing petition to modify the reference
amount for salt products (Docket No. 93P-0448)); W. Dale Parker et al., Citizen Petition,
Docket No. FDA-2005-P-0269 (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/
dockets/05p0269/05p-0269-cp00001-toc.htm; cf Kobick, supra note 227, at 436.
237 See supra note 227.
238 See also Kobick, supra note 227, at 435-36 (discussing history of 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h)).
239 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Request for Public Comment, Food Labeling,
54 Fed. Reg. 32,610 (proposed Aug. 8, 1989).
240 Food Labeling; Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and Nutrient Content Revision,
55 Fed. Reg. 29,487 (proposed July 19, 1990).
241 See Food Labeling; Serving Sizes, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,394 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991); see also
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); National Academy of Sciences, Institute of
Medicine Report on Nutrition Labeling; Availability, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,944 (Oct. 5, 1990).
242 Food Labeling; Serving Sizes, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,394.
243 Id. at 60,397.
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had held a public meeting and met with individual companies.244
Nevertheless, FDA noted that, "in certain circumstances, negotiated
rulemaking may be a useful tool in developing new or amended
reference amounts" and, as a result, proposed making information
about the feasibility of negotiated rulemaking part of a petition to
establish or amend a reference amount. 245 This requirement became
part of the final rule.246 In the preamble to the final regulation, FDA
responded to a comment from a consumer organization that opposed
using negotiated rulemaking to establish reference amounts through
petition247 and retained the requirement that a petition contain a
statement regarding the feasibility of negotiated rulemaking.248 FDA
stated that it has discretion with respect to whether to convene a
negotiation and that it "is convinced that it is frequently useful to
provide a forum for open discussion of particularly contentious
issues."249
There have also been several reports that FDA has considered using
negotiated rulemaking to develop other regulations.250 Despite
expressing an openness to at least consider the use of the negotiated
rulemaking process set forth in the NRA, FDA has not acted on
suggestions that it use negotiated rulemaking.251
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Food Labeling; Serving Size; Technical Amendments, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,039 (Aug. 18, 1993)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); see also 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h)(14) (2013).
247 Food Labeling; Serving Sizes, 58 Fed. Reg. 2229, 2288 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 101).
248 Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h); Kobick, supra note 227, at 435-38 (discussing the
history of 21 C.F.R. § 101.12(h)(14)).
249 Food Labeling; Serving Sizes, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2288. FDA has indicated that it is
considering whether regulations including the regulations in 21 C.F.R. § 101.12 should be
retained, amended, or rescinded. See Food Labeling; Serving Sizes and Nutrition Labeling
(Section 610 Review), 73 Fed. Reg. 71,361 (Nov. 24, 2008).
250 For example, in 1994, it was reported that Office of Chief Mediator and Ombudsman
Regulatory Counsel Suzanne O'Shea said that the FDA was considering negotiated rulemaking
for a rulemaking on the waiver provisions of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992
(PDUFA); O'Shea was quoted as saying that it is "the first time FDA has actively considered
using [negotiated rulemaking] for issuing a rule." FDA Waiver of User Fees, THE PINK SHEET
(Nov. 7, 1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1995, it was
reported that FDA was "in the 'early stages' of using the negotiated rulemaking process to
develop a proposal on certain waiver provisions authorized by [PDUFA]" and had compiled a
list of candidate rules for negotiated rulemaking. OTC Label Reform, Supplement GMPs Seen as
Candidates for Negotiated Rulemaking-HHS, THE TAN SHEET (Sept. 11, 1995). And in 1996, it
was reported that Harvey Rudolph, acting Deputy Director of the Office of Science and
Technology in FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health indicated that negotiated
rulemaking was one option FDA was considering for device software policy development.
Device Software Policy Revisions via Negotiated Rulemaking Under Consideration by FDA, THE
GRAY SHEET (Dec. 23, 1996). He identified "some problems" with negotiated rulemaking,
including resource limitations, but said "it is possible." Id.
251 For example, in letters in 1995, the American Feed Industry Association (AFIA)
requested that in considering amendments to FDA's regulations for liquid medicated animal
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Although FDA has not used the negotiated rulemaking process set
forth in the NRA, some have argued that FDA has engaged in similar
processes in other contexts. 252 For example, FDA's participation in the
Second International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH)-a
conference that "brings together the regulatory and industry authorities
of Europe, Japan and the United States" with the goal of "harmoniz[ing]
the interpretation and application of technical guidelines"253-has been
described as "an international manifestation of negotiated
rulemaking."254 The member regulatory authorities, including FDA, and
industry representatives worked to create consensus guidelines to be
implemented according to each member country's requirements.255 The
feed, FDA should use negotiated rulemaking. Requirements for Liquid Medicated Animal Feed
and Free-Choice Medicated Animal Feed, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,645, 31,645 (proposed May 28, 2003).
AFIA later retreated from this suggestion, indicating that it "anticipated that its concerns would
be addressed in the proposed rule and that '[i]f further rulemaking is necessary, then [it]
believe[d] negotiated rulemaking would be in order."' Id. The preamble to the final rule did not
address this proposal. See Requirements for Liquid Medicated Animal Feed and Free-Choice
Medicated Animal Feed, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,194 (May 27, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 510,
558). The AFIA also suggested that FDA consider negotiated rulemaking for reform of claims
on pet foods and animal fees in 2002 in response to FDA's request for comments on First
Amendment issues. Comments from Feed Control and Nutrition, Am. Feed Indus. Ass'n, in
Response to Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, Docket No. FDA-02N-0209
(Oct. 28, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02nO209/02n-0209-
c000091-voll9.pdf. FDA has not responded to this comment to date.
252 In addition, FDA has used consensus standards to address aspects of the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d(c) (2012); Guidance for Industry and FDA
Staff-Recognition and Use of Consensus Standards, U.S. FDA (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
ucm077274.htm (providing guidance on the use of and voluntary conformance with consensus
standards-"[m]any of [which] have been developed with the participation of [FDA's] Center
for Devices and Radiological Health... staff"); see also Recognized Consensus Standards, U.S.
FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfStandards/search.cfm (last updated
Aug. 5, 2013) (listing standards organizations).
253 International Programs, International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), U.S. FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/InternationalPrograms/Harmonizationlnitiatives/ucml 14571.htm (last
updated Oct. 11, 2011); see also Vision, INT'L CONF. ON HARMONISATION,
http://www.ich.orglabout/vision.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
254 Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food and Drug Administration and the International
Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceutical
Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927, 939 (1995); see also id. at 931, 937-40, 940.
255 See About ICH, Process of Harmonisation, Formal ICH Procedure, INT'L CONF. ON
HARMONISATION, http://www.ich.org/about/process-of-harmonisation/formalproc.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Formal ICH Procedure]; see also Contrera, supra note 254, at
940 n.57 (summarizing the ICH procedure). The harmonization process is overseen by a
Steering Committee (SC); the SC includes two voting members from a regulatory authority and
two members from an industry trade association from each of the following: the United States,
the European Union, and Japan. About ICH, Organisation of ICH, Steering Committee, INT'L
CONF. ON HARMONISATION, http://www.ich.org/about/organisation-of-ich/steering.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014). For the United States, FDA and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) participated. Id. The SC appoints and oversees expert
working groups (EWG), and EWG committees work to create consensus draft guidelines.
Formal ICH Procedure, supra. When the SC agrees with the EWG "that there is sufficient
scientific consensus on the technical issues for the Technical Document to proceed to the next
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process was similar to negotiated rulemaking in that it involved
negotiation and consensus building;256 however, it did not follow the
formal process set forth in the NRA. It was an international exercise,
and the end result in the United States was guidance-not rules.257
Another example is the process used to amend FDA's regulations as part
of its implementation of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).258 Before promulgating a rule
through direct final rulemaking, FDA "convened a public meeting . .. to
provide interested parties with an opportunity to comment on FDA's
current thinking on administration of the ... process," "received
comments," and "considered those comments in developing th[e] direct
final rule and the companion proposed rule."259 While the agency did
not use the formal negotiated process set forth by the NRA, the process
used has been described as "an analogous process";260 the agency
solicited comment before publishing the direct final rule and only
received one comment on the direct final rule.261
Furthermore, while FDA has not used a negotiated rulemaking
committee, it uses other advisory committees to provide "independent
expert advice ... on a range of complex scientific, technical, and policy
stage," the SC signs off on the consensus text. Id. The regulatory parties develop a draft
guideline, which then proceeds to regulatory consultation and discussion. Id. In the United
States, the draft guideline "is published as draft guidance in the Federal Register." Id. Following
the consultation process, the EWG group works to address the comments and reach consensus.
Id. If consensus is reached, the EWG signs-off on the guideline and submits it to the SC for
sign-off by the signatories for the regulatory parties. Id. The final guideline-an ICH
Harmonised Tripartite Guideline-is then implemented "according to the same
national/regional procedures that apply to other regional regulatory guidelines and
requirements" in the countries. Id.
256 Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70a, with Formal ICH Procedure, supra note 255.
257 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70a; see also Regulatory Information, ICH Guidance Documents, U.S.
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucml22049.htm (last updated
June 4, 2010).
258 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-
115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); Kolber, supra note
231, at 101.
259 National Environmental Policy Act; Food Contact Substance Notification System, 65
Fed. Reg. 30,352, 30,353 (May 11, 2000) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 25); see also National
Environmental Policy Act; Food Contact Substance Notification System; Confirmation of
Effective Date, 65 Fed. Reg. 60,359 (Oct. 11, 2000) (confirming effective date of direct final rule
and noting FDA only received one comment on the rule, which "reiterated the association's
views presented in response to an agency public meeting held prior to the initiation of this
rulemaking"); Premarket Notification for Food Contact Substances; Public Meeting, 64 Fed.
Reg. 8577, 8578 (Feb. 22, 1999) (stating that the public meeting "will provide manufacturers
and suppliers of food contact substances, consumer groups, and other interested members of
the public with an overview of FDA's current plans for the implementation of the notification
process," and that "FDA is seeking the views of interested parties on all aspects of the
notification process for food contact substances").
260 Kolber, supra note 231, at 101.
261 See sources cited supra note 259.
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issues" and "a forum for a public hearing on important matters."262
FDA's regulations set forth extensive procedures to govern the use and
conduct of advisory committees.263 The regulations permit policy
advisory committees, which advise on "broad and general matters," as
well as technical advisory committees, which advise on "specific
technical or scientific issues, which may relate to regulatory decisions
before FDA."264 The members of a policy advisory committee are not
required to have "specific technical expertise" and "because members
representing particular interests, e.g., a representative of labor, industry,
consumers, or agriculture, are included on advisory committees
specifically for the purpose of representing th[o]se interests," they are
subject to modified conflict of interest requirements.265 FDA's
experience with advisory committees may inform its use of a negotiated
rulemaking committee.
IV. THE CASE FOR NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
In July 2013, FDA announced its intent to issue an NPRM
proposing to amend its regulations regarding supplements and changes
to and withdrawal of an approved NDA or approved ANDA to "create
parity between NDA holders and ANDA holders with respect to
submission of CBE labeling supplements."266 Shortly thereafter, in
November 2013, FDA issued an NPRM which would permit ANDA
holders to update their product labeling through the CBE process. 267
262 FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE: GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC AND FDA STAFF ON CONVENING
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS 3 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM125651.pdf; see also 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (2013);
Advisory Committees, Committees & Meeting Materials, U.S. FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/default.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2011);
Linda Ann Sherman, Looking Through a Window of the Food and Drug Administration: FDA's
Advisory Committee System, 2 PRECLINICA 99, 99-102 (2004).
263 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.174.
264 Id. § 14.1(b)(2).
265 Id. § 14.80(a).
266 Unified Agenda, Historical Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan, Spring 2013, Department
of Health and Human Services, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for
Approved Drugs and Biological Products, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFS., OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd=201304&RIN=0910-
AG94 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
267 FDA had not finalized this rule as of the date this Article was written. Although the
proposed rule describes processes for NDA, ANDA, and BLA holders, the focus herein will be
on its proposed application to ANDA holders.
The proposed rule would amend 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) to permit FDA to designate a
category of changes that an application holder may make to its drug product labeling upon
submission of a supplemental application for the change to FDA (a CBE-0 supplement).
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,989, 67,998 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)). These labeling changes include changes "to reflect newly acquired
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Although such a proposal is a step toward addressing the issues raised
and highlighted by Mensing, this Part proposes that, rather than proceed
with the conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 268 FDA
should instead utilize negotiated rulemaking as a supplement to the
information ... [t]o add or strengthen a... warning." Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). The
proposed rule would apply equally to application holders and abbreviated application holders,
meaning that generic drug manufacturers who hold ANDAs would be permitted to use the
modified CBE process. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for
Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,998 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c)(8)).
Under the proposed rule, when an ANDA holder submits a CBE supplement to FDA, it
"must send notice of the labeling change proposed in the... [CBE] supplement... to the
application holder for the (RLD]." Id. at 67,998 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)(ii)).
The proposed rule provides that "FDA will promptly post on its Web site information
regarding the labeling changes proposed in the... [CBE] supplement." Id. at 67,998 (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)); see also id. at 67,990. The applicant must verify that the
posted information is correct and, if it is not, notify FDA within five business days. Id. at
67,998.
The ANDA holder may distribute the drug with the revised labeling pending review of
the CBE supplement by FDA. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)(iii)). If FDA
determines that the supplement does not meet the criteria for submission as a supplement
under proposed § 314.70(c)(6) then "the manufacturer must cease distribution of the drug
product(s) accompanied by the revised labeling." Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(7).
In the preamble to its proposed rule, FDA notes that "[i]t is expected that a valid safety
concern regarding a generic drug product also would generally warrant a change to the labeling
through a CBE-0 supplement by the NDA holder for the RLD and, as a consequence, other
generic drug products that reference the RLD." Id. at 67,992. The proposed rule provides that a
supplement for a safety-related labeling change to an abbreviated application "will be approved
upon approval of the same labeling change for the [RLD]." Id. at 67,999 (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. § 314.97). If the RLD has been withdrawn, "FDA may approve ... a supplement to an
approved abbreviated application." Id.
If an ANDA holder submits a labeling supplement and "the NDA holder for the RLD
does not submit a supplement seeking approval for a related or conforming labeling change,
FDA may send a supplement request letter to the NDA holder or, if appropriate, notify the
responsible person of new safety information under section 505(o)(4) of the [FDCA]." Id. at
67,992. FDA "expect[s] that NDA holders will implement safety-related labeling changes
requested by FDA even if not required under [FDCA § 505(o)(4)]." Id.
The proposed rule also would require that when FDA approves changes to the RLD
labeling-or if the application for the RLD has been withdrawn, when FDA approves changes
to the labeling of an ANDA that relied on the RLD-"any other abbreviated application holder
that relied upon the [RLD] must submit a supplement ... with conforming labeling revisions."
Id. at 67,999 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(8)(iv)). The supplement generally must be
submitted within thirty days of FDA posting the approval of the labeling changes on its
website. Id.
The proposed rule would also "add a new exception" to the regulations that provide
grounds for withdrawal of an ANDA. Id. at 67,986, 67,999 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.150). Currently, the regulations "provide that FDA may take steps to withdraw approval
of an ANDA if the generic drug labeling is no longer consistent with the labeling for the RLD."
Id. at 67,986; 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. The
new exception would permit "generic drug labeling that is temporarily inconsistent with the
labeling for the RLD due to safety-related labeling changes submitted by the ANDA holder in a
CBE-0 supplement." Id. at 67,986, 67,999 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.150).
268 Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 920.
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conventional rulemaking process. 269 This Part uses the factors set forth
in the NRA, as well as Harter's criteria, to argue that the issues raised
and highlighted by the Mensing decision appear to be well-suited to
negotiation and that the use of negotiated rulemaking may further the
public interest.270 It also responds to several anticipated critiques of this
proposal.
A. The Need for a Rule
There is a need for new drug labeling regulations. As discussed in
Part I, by finding that state failure-to-warn claims against the
manufacturers of generic drugs are preempted under FDA's current
regulatory regime, the Supreme Court in Mensing removed the
protections that state tort law can provide to consumers of generic
drugs. In addition, that decision highlighted a gap in the regulation of
generic drug labeling: Because under FDA's current interpretation of its
regulations generic drug manufacturers cannot use the CBE process or
Dear Doctor Letters to independently change their labeling (e.g., to
include a new or updated warning), when the brand-name version of a
drug is no longer marketed there is no manufacturer that is responsible
for updating the labeling. This is especially concerning given that
"[m]any serious [Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs)] are discovered only
after a drug has been on the market for years"271 and FDA "faces
269 See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2012). It is not too late for FDA to employ negotiated rulemaking.
While generally negotiated rulemaking is initiated before an NPRM, nothing in the NRA
prohibits an agency from using negotiated rulemaking after an NPRM so long as the
requirements of the NRA are met. See id. §§ 561-570a. Indeed, the Conference has indicated
that negotiated rulemaking can be used at other stages of rulemaking. 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5(3)
(1992); SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 2 (stating that "negotiation sessions generally take
place prior to issuance of the notice and opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed
rule that are required by the Act (5 U.S.C. § 553)," but that "[iun some instances, negotiations
may be appropriate at a later stage of the proceeding"); see also Recommendations and
Statements of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (Dec. 27, 1985) ("The agency should recognize that
negotiations can be useful at several stages of rulemaking proceedings. For example, negotiating
the terms of a final rule could be a useful procedure even after publication of a proposed rule.").
Indeed, several agencies have created negotiated rulemaking committees after publication of an
interim or proposed rule. See Notice of Intent to Form a Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory
Committee, Vehicles Built in Two or More Stages, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,499 (May 20, 1999); Notice
of a Negotiated Rulemaking, Paleontology; Negotiated Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 48,647 (Nov.
24, 1989); Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, Varroa Mite Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,217
(proposed Apr. 17. 1989). FDA's publication of an NPRM regarding supplemental applications
proposing label changes for approved drugs may provide further support for negotiated
rulemaking. See infra Part IV.D.
270 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a; Harter, supra note 172.
271 K.E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription
Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2218 (2002) ("Premarketing drug trials are often underpowered
to detect ADRs, and have limited follow-up." (footnotes omitted)).
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significant resource constraints that limit its ability to protect the public
from dangerous drugs."272 Furthermore, the different potential remedies
for injured consumers of generic versus brand-name drugs are
inconsistent with the principle of the "sameness" of brand-name and
generic drugs.273
FDA could change its interpretation of its regulations, which was
set out in the United States' amicus brief,274 by promulgating new
regulations through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 275
which negotiated rulemaking supplements. The Court in Mensing noted
that FDA retains the authority to change its regulations if it so desires,276
and several members of Congress have called upon FDA to consider
changes to its regulations.277 In apparent recognition of the need for
regulatory change, FDA has proposed new regulations using the notice-
and-comment rulemaking process. 278
272 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
273 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
274 U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents, supra note 36, at 15, 17 (stating that "[t]he CBE
process was not available to [the generic drug manufacturers] to unilaterally change their drugs'
approved labeling," and that "[t]he PAS process also was not available"). The Mensing opinion
also cites the preamble to FDA's ANDA Regulations. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567,
2575 (2011). In that preamble, in response to comments that generic drug manufacturers
should be able "to deviate from the labeling for the [RLD] to add contraindications, warnings,
precautions, adverse reactions, and other safety-related information," FDA stated that "[e]xcept
for labeling differences due to exclusivity or a patent and differences under section 505(j)(2)(v)
of the [FDCA], [the generic drug's] labeling must be the same as the listed drug product's
labeling." Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,961 (Apr. 28,
1992).
The Court relied on Mensing in its decision in Bartlett, stating that Mensing "made clear,
federal law prevents generic drug manufacturers from changing their labels." Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
at 2476 (citing Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577).
275 See Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 920 (noting that while FDA may not be able to use an
interpretative rule to change its interpretation, FDA "could clearly change its regulations (at
least through notice-and-comment)"); see also id. at 917-24.
276 Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582.
277 See Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy et al., to Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Commissioner,
FDA (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter Letter], available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/
06-24-13-pjl-et-al-to-fda-re-bartlett. While bills were introduced in the 112th Congress that
would have permitted generic drug manufacturers to change the labeling of the drugs in the
same manner as brand-name drug manufacturers may do under current law, both bills died in
committee. See S. 2295, 112th Congress, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=112 (search "S. 2295" & "H.R.
4384"). No similar bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress. Several of the co-sponsors
of the legislation introduced in the 112th Congress (along with others), however, have urged
FDA "to expedite its consideration of revisions to the FDA's drug labeling regulations." Letter,
supra.
278 See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 314, 610); see also FDA Response to Public Citizen, supra note 79, at 4.
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B. The Issues Are Concrete, Ready for Decision, and Sufficient to
Permit Trade-Offs
The issues for consideration are concrete and ready for decision.279
Three recent Supreme Court decisions- Wyeth, Mensing, and Bartlett-
have turned on FDA's regulation of drug labeling.280 Additionally, the
regulation of generic drug labeling and the potential implications of the
Supreme Court's findings of the preemption of state failure-to-warn
claims and at least some design claims have been explored in dissenting
opinions,281 briefing,282 and a growing body of academic literature,283
which have helped to define the issues for consideration.
In addition, there are multiple issues, which may permit trade-offs
among the parties to maximize their interests.284 As discussed in Parts I
and II, the issues for consideration should include: (1) the preemption
of state failure-to-warn claims; (2) the concomitant removal of the
protective and compensatory functions that state tort law can provide to
generic drug consumers; (3) the gap in the regulation of generic drug
labeling in which no manufacturer is responsible for labeling updates;
(4) who should be able to make labeling changes and under what
circumstances; (5) how to encourage appropriate and timely warnings;
(6) whether and how to reconcile differences between the labeling of
different versions of a drug after a labeling change; and (7) whether
there is a need for increased information sharing, reporting, or
producing in order for manufacturers to fulfill any new regulatory
responsibilities. While not an exhaustive list of potential issues (and
additional issues could arise during negotiated rulemaking), this list
serves to illustrate that while FDA's regulation of drug labeling is likely
to be at the heart of any rulemaking, there are several other issues and
sub-issues.
The various interests are likely to prioritize these issues differently
and have different values, which may further negotiation by permitting
trade-offs; however, the interests might all share the value of consumer
access to safe and effective drugs.285 This shared value may serve as the
279 See Harter, supra note 173, at 47 (identifying "Mature Issues" as one of the criteria for
determining when negotiation is likely to be fruitful).
280 See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476-77 (2013); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at
2574-77; Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568-73 (2009).
281 See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2483 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
282 See, e.g., Brief for Marc T. Law et al., supra note 11; U.S. Brief Supporting Respondents,
supra note 36; U.S. Brief, supra note 36.
283 See supra Part II.
284 See Harter, supra note 173, at 50; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 214, at 152.
285 While this Article does not seek to identify particular representatives for the proposed
negotiated rulemaking, the mission statements of FDA and associations of the brand-name and
generic pharmaceutical industries, healthcare providers, and consumers suggest that this may
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foundation for regulatory negotiation. According to Harter, "the more
the parties agree on fundamental principles that shape the decision, the
more likely it is that negotiations will be successful."286
C. Interests Likely to Be Impacted and Representation
There appears to be a limited number of identifiable interests that
would be significantly affected by a rule to address the issues implicated
by the Mensing decision. Pursuant to the NRA, an "interest" is "multiple
parties which have a similar point of view or which are likely to be
affected in a similar manner" with respect to an issue. 287 So, for example,
although a change in the regulation of generic drug labeling may affect
all generic drug companies,288 the companies may be affected in a
similar manner and therefore represent one interest.
The negotiated rulemaking committee membership must include
at least one person representing FDA.289 Given the issues identified in
the prior section, there are several other interests that may be
significantly impacted by a new rule and should be represented on the
committee.29 0 For example, any rule that changes the regulation of
be a shared value. See, e.g., About AMA, Our Mission, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-mission.page (last visited Mar. 18, 2014); About FDA, What
We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm (last updated Sept. 19,
2013); About PhRMA, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about (last visited Mar. 18, 2013);
About, The Association, GPHA, http://www.gphaonline.org/about/the-gpha-association (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014); Health and Safety, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?
pid=524 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2012) (FDA's Mission).
286 Harter, supra note 173, at 49.
287 5 U.S.C. § 562(5).
288 GENERIC INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 159, at 4, 50 (stating that the number of
enterprises is "[t] he most relevant measure of the number of firms" in the generic drug industry
and that there were 1103 enterprises in 2012).
289 5 U.S.C. § 565(b).
290 As of the date this Article was written, FDA's proposed rule was still pending. FDA,
following several requests for an extension, extended the comment period to March 13, 2014.
See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products; Correction and Extension of Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,796, 78,796 (Dec. 27,
2013). As a result, the scope of the comments that the FDA will receive in response to its
proposed rule and the identities of the eventual commenters are not known. The requests for an
extension of the comment period and the comments that were publically available when this
Article was written, however, suggest several interests that may be significantly impacted by a
new rule-including brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies, consumers, health
care providers, pharmacists, pharmacies, and pharmacy benefit management organizations.
See, e.g., Acad. Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) et al., Request for Extension of Comment
Period on Proposed Rule Regarding Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes
for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0500 (Dec. 17, 2013);
Biotechnology Indus. Org. (BIO) & PhRMA, Request for an Extension of Comment Period:
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0500 (Dec. 17, 2013); Cornerstone Regulatory on FDA
Proposed Rule: Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs
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generic drugs-by changing the labeling requirements or information
sharing, reporting, or producing requirements-will likely significantly
impact generic drug manufacturers. Regulatory change may also
similarly impact brand-name manufacturers.291 Consumers may be
significantly impacted by changes in the regulation of drugs and in the
preemption of state failure-to-warn claims because such changes may
impact the safety and efficacy of generic drugs and potential remedies
available to consumers injured by such drugs. A regulatory change may
also significantly impact healthcare providers because prescription drug
labeling is written for healthcare providers licensed to administer
prescription drugs,292 who use the labeling to make prescription
decisions.293 A regulatory change may significantly impact doctors. The
American Medical Association (AMA) has argued that differences in
liability rules for generic and brand-name drugs "pose an ethical
dilemma for physicians" because there is "no guarantee that the product
safety information accompanying a generic drug is current or
reliable."294
Other potential interests that may be significantly impacted by a
new rule include states, biologic manufacturers, and pharmacists. The
aim of this discussion is not to identify an exclusive list of interests for
and Biological Products, Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0500 (Nov. 20, 2013); GPhA, Request for
Extension of Comment Period on Proposed Rule Regarding Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, Docket No. FDA-
2013-N-0500 (Nov. 27, 2013); Mylan, Request for Extension of Comment Period on Proposed
Rule "Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products," Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0500 (Dec. 17, 2013); Patient, Consumer, &
Pub. Health Coalition on the FDA's Proposed Rule: Supplemental Applications Proposing
Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0500
(Feb. 5, 2014); Perrigo, Request for Extension, Proposed Rule: Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, Docket No. FDA-
2013-N-500 (Dec. 9, 2013).
291 For example, a change might require the manufacturers of brand-name drugs to update
their drug labeling following generic drug labeling updates. It might also require brand-name
drug manufacturers-which hold the NDAs and clinical trial data, and may receive adverse
event reports for both the brand-name and generic versions of a drug-to provide information
to facilitate generic labeling updates. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501) (arguing that generics "rarely"
get adverse event reports because doctors typically report the adverse event to the brand-name
manufacturer); FDA, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: HANDLING OF ADVERSE
EXPERIENCE REPORTS AND OTHER GENERIC DRUG POSTMARKETING REPORTS 1 (Nov. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/Manualof
PoliciesProcedures/ucm079791.pdf (stating that "[g]enerally, [FDA's Office of Generic Drugs]
receives few [Adverse Experience Reports] or similar reports since the reports may not specify a
generic manufacturer for the drug product").
292 A prescription drug is a drug for which adequate directions for use for a layperson
cannot be written. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f)(1), 353(b)(1)-(2); 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2013).
293 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f)(1), 353(b)(1)-(2); 21 C.F.R. § 201.5; Brief of the Am. Med. Ass'n et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5-6, 13-14, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-
993, 09-1039, 09-1501) [hereinafter AMA Brief].
294 AMA Brief, supra note 293, at 29-30.
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participation in a negotiated rulemaking, but rather to suggest that the
"number of identifiable interests that will be significantly affected by the
rule" (and thus, the number of committee members needed to represent
such interests) is limited, and appears likely to be less than the twenty-
five-member limit generally provided by the NRA.295 FDA could use a
convener to assist it in "identifying persons who will be significantly
affected by a proposed rule" and conducting discussions with them to
identify their issues of concern.296
The NRA requires that before convening a negotiated rulemaking
committee, FDA must consider whether it is reasonably likely that it
could convene a negotiated rulemaking committee with a balanced
representation of persons who (1) can "adequately represent" the
interests identified as "significantly affected by the rule;" and (2) "are
willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus" on a proposed
rule.297 It seems reasonably likely that FDA could convene such a
committee.298 For example, trade associations, such as the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and
the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA), may be able to
represent the interests of brand-name and generic drug manufacturers,
respectively. 299 Similarly, consumer and professional organizations, such
as Public Citizen and the AMA, may be able to represent the consumer
and healthcare provider's interests. 300 FDA may be able to draw on its
295 5 U.S.C. §§ 563(a)(2), 565(b); see also Recommendations of the Administrative
Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,709 (July 15, 1982) (suggesting that there should be a
limited number of interests significantly affected by the rule and represented in negotiations);
Harter, supra note 173, at 46.
296 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(b); see also id. § 562(3).
297 Id. § 563; see also id. § 565.
298 The requests for an extension of the comment period and the comments that were
publically available when this Article was written suggest that FDA may be able to identify trade
associations, professional associations, and coalitions to represent the different interests. See,
e.g., AMCP et al., supra note 290; BIO & PhRMA, supra note 290; GPhA, supra note 290;
Patient, Consumer, Public Health Coalition, supra note 290.
299 About, The Association, GPHA, supra note 285 (describing the GPhA as "the nation's
leading trade association for manufacturers and distributors of generic prescription drugs,
manufacturers of bulk active pharmaceutical chemicals, and suppliers of other goods and
services to the generic industry"); About PhRMA, PHRMA, supra note 285 (describing PhRMA
as "represent[ing] the country's leading biopharmaceutical researchers and biotechnology
companies"); see also supra note 255 (noting PhRMA's participation in the analogous ICH
negotiations).
3oo Health and Safety, PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 285 ("Public Citizen's health and safety work
protects consumers by advocating for safer, more effective drugs.. . ."); AMA Brief, supra note
293, at 1 (stating that the AMA "is the largest professional association of physicians, residents
and medical students in the United States" and that "through state and specialty medical
societies and other physician groups seated in its House of Delegates, substantially all United
States physicians, residents and medical students are represented in the AMA's policy making
process").
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experience in convening advisory committees to facilitate this
process. 301
D. Potential Gains
There are several reasons why the significantly affected interests
may be "willing to negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on the
proposed rule"302 to reform the regulation of drug labeling and believe
that negotiated rulemaking would be for their benefit. 303
First, the inevitability and imminence of FDA's promulgation of a
proposed rule may encourage the interests to negotiate in good faith.
FDA has proposed a rule that would revise the procedures for changes
to the labeling of an approved drug, which suggests that a new rule is
inevitable, if not imminent.304 This may create a sense of urgency on the
part of the participants in the proposed negotiated rulemaking and may
speed up negotiations.305 The participants may view the proposed
negotiated rulemaking as an opportunity for meaningful participation
in and some control over the creation of a new regulatory system for
drugs, which the participants may view as a gain.306 If the negotiated
rulemaking committee failed to reach a consensus, FDA could continue
with the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. This possibility may
further encourage negotiation because the participants would know that
if negotiation failed they would be deprived of the opportunity for
meaningful participation in the rulemaking.307 For example, while
generic drug manufacturers may prefer the status quo-in which their
labeling responsibilities are limited and they are shielded from state tort
claims-they may be willing to participate in negotiations to create new
regulations if they know that change is inevitable.
Second, the fact that the drug industry is a "highly regulated
industry, in which all the players-including the agency, the drug
companies, and even the representatives of consumers-are repeat
301 See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
302 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(B).
303 See Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference Regarding
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,893, 52,895 (Dec. 27, 1985); Harter,
supra note 173, at 42-43.
304 See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 314,610).
305 See Harter, supra note 173, at 47-48.
306 See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 62 (finding that all participants in a study by
Langbein & Kerwin "reacted more favorably to their experience with negotiated rules than do
participants in conventional rulemaking").
307 See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 63-69.
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players"308 may encourage the participants to negotiate in good faith, as
they are likely to have to have future interactions.309
Third, although the current regulatory system's impact on the
various interests is highly complex (and empirical evidence would be
needed to make any definitive statements about its impact), certain
aspects of the current system may harm each of the interests likely to be
impacted by a rulemaking. The preemption of state tort claims against
the manufacturers of generic drugs based on the current regulatory
regime could potentially harm generic drug manufacturers by
decreasing the market for generic drugs: Doctors concerned about the
"ethical dilemma" of prescribing generics over brand-name drugs may
prescribe generic drugs less and may prevent generic substitutions.310
Consumers concerned about the different potential legal remedies for
brand-name and generic drugs may request brand-name drugs.311 And
states concerned about preemption of state tort law claims against
generic manufacturers may change their laws to discourage generic
substitution.312 The current regime also could potentially harm brand-
name manufacturers if injured generic drug consumers foreclosed from
bringing claims against a generic manufacturer looked to the
manufacturer of the corresponding brand-name drug for recovery on
the basis that the brand-name manufacturer was responsible for the
content of the labeling.313 While many courts have declined to permit
such "innovator liability" suits, these decisions were based in part upon
308 Rakoff, supra note 231, at 169-70; see also Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 935 (Cal.
1980) ("[Tlhe drug industry is closely regulated by [FDA], which actively controls the testing
and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they are marketed, including the contents
of warning labels.").
309 Additional reasons why the representatives may be willing to negotiate in good faith are
discussed infra Part V.F.
310 AMA Brief, supra note 293, at 29-30; see also Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 914-15;
Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician's Office: A
Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 162 (2007).
311 Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Acquiescence to Patient Demands for Brand-Name
Drugs: Results of a National Survey of Physicians, 173 JAMA 237, 238 (2013) ("Approximately 4
of 10 physicians report that they sometimes or often prescribe a brand-name drug to a patient
when a generic is available because the patient wanted it."); Kazhdan, supra note 87, at 915.
312 Kazhdan supra note 87, at 915-17.
313 See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1:10-cv-602, 2013 WL 135753, at *15 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013),
reh'g granted (June 13, 2013) (noting that Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th
Cir. 1994), was issued before the Mensing decision and that "[tihe Foster court's finding that
manufacturers of generic drugs are responsible for the representations they make in their
labeling regarding their products is flawed based on the 'sameness' requirement discussed in
[Mensing]"); Rostron, supra note 87, at 1135 (stating pre-Mensing that "if the Supreme Court
should find that federal law preempts claims against generic drug manufacturers, the question
of whether brand-name drug makers can be liable to those who took generic drugs will take on
greater significance than ever before"); Weeks, supra note 88, at 1258 ("While... so-called
innovator liability suits have generally been unsuccessful in the past, the Mensing decision
undermines a large part of the rationale for not allowing these suits." (footnotes omitted)).
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the conclusion that generic drug manufacturers could supplement their
drug warnings. 314 A few courts have extended liability to brand-name
manufacturers on the basis that such manufacturers owe a duty of care
to generic drug consumers. 315 Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV.C,
the current regulatory system may pose an "ethical dilemma" for
healthcare providers and may have negative implications for consumers.
The potential for these harms may further encourage negotiation.
E. Countervailing Power
Power appears to be divided among the interests in the proposed
negotiation such that no interest would hold all of the power. The
existence of a balance of power is one of the criteria that Harter
identified as predictive of successful negotiations because if a party "has
the power to achieve its goal" without having to negotiate with others, it
will do so. 316 Both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers are
likely to have significant power in a negotiated rulemaking regarding
the regulation of drug labeling due to the extent of their markets and
importance of the drugs that they produce to the public health.317
Brand-name drug manufacturers may also have significant power
because they control a lot of the information about the drugs that they
314 See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc.,
85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 317 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting that in declining to follow Foster the court was
"depart[ing] from the majority of courts to have wrestled with th[e] particular issue"); Weeks,
supra note 88, at 1267-69, 1290; see also Jim Beck & Mark Herrmann, Scorecard: Innovator
Liability in Generic Drug Cases, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009, 12:17 PM),
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/1 1/scorecard-non-manufacturer-name-
brand.html (listing cases).
315 See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708-09 (D. Vt. 2010) (denying brand-
name manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that brand-name
manufacturer had a duty of care in disseminating information about a drug and it was
"reasonably foreseeable that a physician will rely upon a brand name manufacturer's
representations-or the absence of representations-about the risk of side effects of its drug,
when deciding to prescribe the drug for a patient, regardless of whether the pharmacist fills the
prescription with a generic form of the drug"); Weeks, 2013 WL 135753, at *19 (holding that
"[u]nder Alabama law, a brand-name drug company may be held liable for fraud or
misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection
with the manufacture of a brand-name prescription drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury
caused by a generic drug manufactured by a different company"); Conte, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
320-21 (holding that the brand-name manufacturer's "common-law duty to use due care in
formulating its product warnings extends to patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on its
product information when prescribing [the drug], whether the prescription is written for
and/or filled with [the brand-name drug] or its generic equivalent").
316 Harter, supra note 173, at 45.
317 See, e.g., SOPHIA SNYDER, IBISWORLD INDUSTRY REPORT 32541A, BRAND NAME
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING IN THE US 4-5 (June 2012) (stating that brand name
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry had revenue of $156.3 billion in 2011); GENERIC
INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 159, at 4-5 (stating that the generic manufacturing industry had
revenue of $52.8 billion in 2011).
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produce, having sponsored the NDA and undertaken clinical trials to
provide substantial evidence of the drug's safety and efficacy.31s Generic
drug manufacturers may also have significant power as a result of the
cost savings, 319 as well as structures such as state laws and insurance
plans, that encourage generic drug use.320 FDA also may have significant
power by virtue of its broad "authority to promulgate regulations for the
efficient enforcement" of the FDCA and the fact that if a negotiated
rulemaking committee could not reach a consensus, it could proceed
with notice-and-comment rulemaking.321 Healthcare providers may
have significant power in their role as prescribers and learned
intermediaries.322 Consumers may have power based on their ability to
request drugs and make purchasing choices,323 although this power may
be somewhat constrained by state substitution laws and insurance. Even
if the parties to negotiated rulemaking were to have unequal power,
however, the use of negotiated rulemaking may still be appropriate
because the process may empower and constrain each of the parties.324
For example, although FDA could abandon the negotiated rulemaking
process at any point, it may refrain from doing so because it may not
want to appear responsible for a failure to reach consensus.325
F. Potential Benefits
There are several reasons why using negotiated rulemaking to
create new drug regulations may be in the public interest.326 First, using
negotiated rulemaking to create new drug regulations may be faster than
conventional rulemaking. To date, FDA has not used negotiated
rulemaking, and the discussions of the use of this process have been
based on the experiences of other agencies such as the Environmental
318 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (2013).
319 See, e.g., GPHA, supra note 154, at 1 (" [G]eneric drug use has saved the U.S. health care
system approximately $1.07 trillion over the past decade (2002 through 2011) with $192.8
billion in savings achieved in 2011 alone.").
320 See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF BDS. OF PHARMACY, supra note 1, at 67-70; Save with Generic
Drugs, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/individuals-families-health-insurance/pharmacy-
prescription-drugs/generic-drugs/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) (indicating that Aetna
promotes the use of generic drugs and that some of its health plans provide a lower co-pay for
generic drugs).
321 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012).
322 See id. § 353; Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK.
L. REv. 839, 890 (2009) (describing the learned intermediary doctrine).
323 See Campbell, supra note 311, at 238.
324 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 214, at 154-55 ("Unequal power entering a
negotiated rulemaking turned out to be much less of a problem than Harter and others
imagined because the process empowers all the parties in various ways and constrains the most
powerful.").
325 Id.
326 See 5 U.S.C. § 563.
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Protection Agency (EPA).327 There are empirical data which suggest
that, when measured by the average time for the EPA to fulfill its goal,
negotiated rulemaking was "thirty-two percent faster than traditional
rulemaking," even though the rules selected for negotiation are "highly
complex and controversial" and "dynamics surrounding these rules are
by no means 'average.'"328 Negotiated rulemaking may save time by
reducing the time the agency "ordinarily would have spent to collect and
analyze data and to respond to public comments" in conventional
notice-and-comment rulemaking.329 If using negotiated rulemaking to
address the issues raised by and flowing from the Mensing decision
reduces the rulemaking time (as compared to notice-and-comment
rulemaking), this may promote the public health because drug labeling
is an important component of drug safety.330 But even if negotiated
rulemaking is not faster than conventional rulemaking,331 it may hold
other benefits. 332
By engaging persons who can adequately represent the interests
that will be significantly affected by a new drug labeling rule, negotiated
rulemaking may produce "better rules."333 The literature on negotiated
rulemaking suggests that negotiated rulemaking may produce
regulations that reflect the insight and expertise of stakeholders, are
innovative, and "take account of issues that would likely escape the
attention of an agency in a traditional rulemaking."334 These potential
benefits may be important in the context of drug labeling regulation,
which is a central means by which FDA seeks to ensure that marketed
drugs are safe and effective.335 The current regulations governing drug
labeling changes establish processes for when and how manufacturers
may update their drug labeling and communicate these changes to FDA.
As discussed in Part I.C, there are issues that stem from FDA's current
approach to drug labeling regulation, including a gap in which there is
327 See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 211, at 1273 (stating that "much of the current empirical
analysis of negotiated rulemaking focuses on the EPA[, which].... has attempted and
completed the most negotiated rulemakings").
328 Harter, supra note 172, at 49.
329 Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 75.
330 See Helm, supra note 310, at 186 ("FDA has long endeavored to protect the public health
through its restrictions on drug labels"); see also id. at 120-21; Alison G. Vredenburgh & Ilene
B. Zackowitz, Drug Labeling and Its Impact on Patient Safety, 33 WORK 169, 169 (2009) ("The
drug safety system relies on the pharmaceutical companies to provide accurate and complete
warnings and contraindications to physicians and patients.").
331 See supra Part III.C.
332 See Harter, supra note 173, at 28-31.
333 Id. at 115.
334 Philip J. Harter, Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DuKE L.J. 1389,
1403 (1997); see also Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 66-67; Langbein & Kerwin, supra
note 223, at 605-08.
335 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2012); 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314 (2013); see also Helm, supra
note 310, at 120-22.
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no manufacturer responsible for the labeling of some drugs and the
removal of the protections that state tort law can provide generic drug
consumers. In addition, the current regulatory procedure for labeling
updates (in which a manufacturer must update its generic drug labeling
to match that of the corresponding brand-name drug following an
update to the brand-name labeling) may not be functioning optimally;
this may result in differences between the labeling of the brand-name
and generic versions of a drug product.336 While the impact of these
differences on patient safety is not known, there may need to be
"changes in the labeling cascade.. . to ensure ongoing synchronization
of drug safety warnings."337 The existing labeling regime was created by
FDA regulations promulgated through notice-and-comment
rulemaking and supplemented by the agency's interpretations in
preambles, briefs, and guidance.338 Negotiated rulemaking may result in
a process that functions better than the existing process.
Using negotiated rulemaking to create new drug labeling and post-
market safety rules may also increase the legitimacy of FDA's final
rule.339 An empirical study of negotiated rulemaking found that "[t]here
is no evidence that negotiated rules comprise an abrogation of agency
authority."340 In fact, "there is some indication that rules that emerge
from reg negs are more stringent than those the agency would have been
able to issue on its own."341 The determination of which interests "are
substantially affected, and hence entitled to participate," in the drug
rulemaking is crucial to the legitimacy of the process and the legitimacy
of the final rule, which "must reflect the consensus among the affected
interests."342 The FACA may further enhance the legitimacy of the
negotiations.343 Because negotiated rulemaking is a supplement to
notice-and-comment rulemaking, it also incorporates the procedural
protections that the later process affords: The agency must still publish
336 See Duke, supra note 118, at 299-300.
337 Id. at 300; see also supra note 35 (discussing court cases in which it was alleged that the
generic drug label differed from that of the brand-name drug).
338 See discussion supra Part I.B; see also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57
Fed. Reg. 17,950 (Apr. 28, 1992) (preamble and final rule); New Drug and Antibiotic
Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7466-70, 7498-99 (Feb. 22, 1985) (preamble and final rule).
339 See Freeman & Langbein, supra note 214, at 63, 124-127. Legitimacy in the context of
notice-and-comment rulemaking has been defined as the "acceptability of the regulation to
those involved in its development." Id. at 63.
340 Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 223, at 625.
341 Harter, supra note 334, at 1403-04.
342 Philip J. Harter, The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM.
U. L. REv. 471, 480 (1983); see also id. at 489 ("[A] consensual rule derives its validity from the
fact of consensus-within the contours of authorizing legislation defined by the body politic-
whereas rules outside that consensus derive their validity through the traditional means of
testing the rationality of the process."); see also Harter, supra note 334, at 1407.
343 See Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated Rulemaking at
EPA, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 172, at 839, 841.
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the NPRM in the Federal Register, give interested persons the
opportunity for comment and, after consideration of those comments,
include a concise general statement of the rule's basis and purpose when
it publishes the final rule.344 Using negotiated rulemaking and consensus
building to create new drug regulations may also lead to better
relationships among the participants, which are likely to be repeat
players in the world of drug regulation.34- The perceived legitimacy of
the final rule and the interactions among participants in the rulemaking
may be significant because, while promulgation of a new final rule is an
important first step in reform, once a new rule goes into effect the
success of any new regulatory regime will depend on the participation of
FDA and the stakeholders.
In sum, using negotiated rulemaking to create new drug
regulations may be faster, produce better and more widely accepted
rules, and create better relationships among participants than
conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking. While other agencies'
experiences with negotiated rulemaking inform the current analysis, the
potential benefits of FDA's use of negotiated rulemaking to create new
regulations are largely theoretical. To date, FDA has not used negotiated
rulemaking and, thus, there are and can be no studies of how negotiated
rulemaking has served FDA. Unless FDA is willing to employ negotiated
rulemaking, the potential benefits will remain theoretical. In light of
this, the characteristics of the current regulatory issues, and the
potential benefits of regulatory negotiation, this Article concludes that
FDA should use negotiated rulemaking to create new drug regulations.
G. Response to Anticipated Criticisms
Despite the potential benefits of negotiated rulemaking, there may
be critiques of the proposal that FDA use negotiated rulemaking to
address the issues flowing from the Mensing decision. First, critics may
argue that FDA does not need to use negotiated rulemaking because
FDA already provides for public participation in the rulemaking process
through its use of advisory committees and public meetings. 346 This
344 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see also Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 214, at
89 (stating that in negotiated rulemaking "[t]he public is certainly no less represented ... than
it is in traditional notice and comment"); Harter, supra note 334, at 1405 ("[Clonvening is a
form of outreach in which the agency actively seeks diverse representatives to take part in the
development of the rule from its infancy. As a result, a far greater range of interests actually
participates in the rule than in customary notice-and-comment rulemaking where the agency
passively receives comments."); Harter, supra note 342, at 472-76.
345 See Freeman, The Private Role, supra note 214, at 656-57; Rakoff, supra note 231, at 169-
70.
346 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.65; 14.1-14.174 (2013); HHS & FDA, JUSTIFICATION FOR ESTIMATES
FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 364 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
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critique, however, neglects to account for the unique features of the
NRA framework. Although a negotiated rulemaking committee
established by FDA pursuant to the NRA would be an advisory
committee, it would differ in important ways from FDA's other advisory
committees due to its focus on negotiation. The NRA's provisions are
tailored to the purpose of utilizing negotiation to generate consensus
among stakeholders for use as the basis for a proposed rule. For
example, the NRA provides for the use of a convener to assist the agency
in assessing whether to undertake negotiated rulemaking and the use of
facilitators to assist the negotiation process. 347 A negotiated rulemaking
committee's purpose would be to use negotiation to produce a
consensus among stakeholders to be used as the basis for a proposed
rule and not simply to "provide advice and recommendations to the
[FDA] Commissioner."348 Furthermore, the agency's commitment to
use the consensus of the committee as a basis for a proposed rule "to the
maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of the
agency"349 is an "essential ingredient of the success" of the process.350 As
discussed in Parts III.C and IV.F, many of the potential benefits of
negotiated rulemaking may flow from the negotiations and consensus
building that characterize the process-benefits that the standard
advisory committee process may not produce.35'
Second, critics may argue that negotiated rulemaking could cost
both FDA and participants more than conventional notice-and-
comment rulemaking.352 FDA's resources are limited,353 and FDA has
expressed concerns about resource limitations and negotiated
rulemaking.354 There are several reasons, however, why negotiated
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM347422.pdf ("FDA currently
has 51 advisory committees and panels with 634 authorized positions. The agency holds
approximately 85 meetings per year with the participation of over 1,300 outside experts.");
Kobick, supra note 227, at 439-40.
347 5 U.S.C. §§ 562(2)-(3), 563(b), 566; see also 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1983); Harter, supra
note 173, at 77-79.
348 21 C.F.R. § 14.5(a) (2013). Compare 21 C.F.R. § 14.5 (discussing FDA advisory
committees), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (describing negotiated rulemaking under the NRA).
See generally Harter, supra note 173.
349 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (stating that "the head of the agency shall consider
whether . .. the agency, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the legal obligations of
the agency, will use the consensus of the committee with respect to the proposed rule as the
basis for the rule proposed by the agency for notice and comment"); see also Recommendations
of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,710 (July 15, 1982) (recommending
that "[t]he agency should publish the negotiated text of the proposed rule in its [NPRM]" and,
if it does not, "it should explain its reasons").
350 Harter, supra note 173, at 100.
351 See supra Part IV.F.
352 See Lubbers, supra note 172, at 997-98; Kobick, supra note 227, at 438-39.
353 See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
354 See Contrera, supra note 254, at 952-53; Kobick, supra note 227, at 437-39.
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rulemaking may still be beneficial and may lead to some cost savings.
The members of the negotiated rulemaking committee may bring to the
table important information about how changes in the regulation may
impact the prescription drug industry, individual businesses, healthcare
providers, and consumers that the agency would otherwise have to
speculate about or invest resources in locating or developing.355 In
addition, negotiated rulemaking may save the agency and stakeholders
costs at the end of the rulemaking (i.e., through fewer comments and
court challenges) as well as in the implementation of, compliance with,
and enforcement of a new rule by creating a more effective rule.356 In
addition, FDA likely does not have the resources to effectively monitor
and update generic drug labeling.357 Accordingly, investing in the
creation of a better regulatory system in which drug manufacturers are
responsible for labeling updates and state failure-to-warn claims are not
preempted may be especially important in promoting drug safety.358
Furthermore, FDA is not unique in its resource limitations.359 Other
agencies have employed negotiated rulemaking even after considering
their resources as required by the NRA.360 Also, the NRA permits the
agency to provide assistance to negotiated rulemaking committee
members whose participation is necessary to assure adequate
representation and who "certif[y] a lack of adequate financial resources
to participate in the committee."361
A third anticipated criticism is that negotiated rulemaking may
create rules that are no less subject to litigation than conventional
rules.362 But even if rules produced using negotiated rulemaking have a
similar rate of judicial review as those produced by conventional
rulemaking, using negotiated rulemaking to create new drug rules may
still be valuable in light of the potential benefits that negotiated
355 See Freeman, The Private Role, supra note 214, at 641.
356 See Harter, supra note 172, at 56 (stating that negotiated rules were viewed more
favorably by participants with respect to "the economic efficiency of the rule and its cost
effectiveness"); Harter, supra note 334, at 1403-04 (stating that there is some indication that
rules produced through negotiated rulemaking "are cheaper to implement precisely because the
committee can focus on ways to get the greatest return"); Lubbers, supra note 172, at 997;
Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, and Possibly
Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1143, 1180 n.137 (1999) (suggesting that
regulated parties may "place a higher value on comprehensibility and ease of administration").
357 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 & n.11 (2009).
358 See supra Part I.C.
359 See Kobick, supra note 227, at 442.
360 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(6) (2012); Kobick, supra note 227, at 442-43.
361 See 5 U.S.C. § 568(c); Lubbers, supra note 172, at 998 (noting that the NRA anticipated
participant resource concerns, but that funds for assistance "have been scarce").
362 See Coglianese, supra note 211, at 1286-1309; Harter, supra note 172, at 55 (quoting
Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 223, at 625-26); Kobick, supra note 227, at 441-42.
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rulemaking may offer as compared to notice-and-comment rulemaking,
as discussed in Part IV.F.363
CONCLUSION
Using negotiated rulemaking to bring together generic drug
manufacturers, brand-name drug manufacturers, consumers, healthcare
providers, FDA, and other interests to work towards consensus on new
drug labeling regulations may be particularly appropriate in light of the
fact that the Hatch-Waxman Act (which laid the foundation for the
modern generic market) is commonly viewed as compromise
legislation.364 While negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate for all
rulemaking, there are reasons to think that it may be appropriate and
offer benefits in the current situation. To date, FDA has not used the
negotiated rulemaking process set forth in the NRA but, to quote
Harter, "[a]t the very least, regulatory negotiation is worth a try."365
363 See Harter, supra note 172, at 52-56.
364 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
365 Harter, supra note 173, at 113; see also Jody Freeman, Remarks by Professor Jody Freeman
to Japanese American Law Society, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1859, 1868 (2005) ("To assess whether the
theory works in practice, however, more experimentation is needed along with monitoring and
empirical evaluation.").
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